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United States v. Klein, Then and Now 
Gordon G. Young∗©  
United States v. Klein, decided during Reconstruction, was the first 
U.S. Supreme Court case to invalidate a statutory restriction on federal 
courts’ jurisdiction.  It is the only case to do so by finding a violation of 
Article III of the Constitution.  Klein has been cited in thirty-three U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions and roughly five hundred times each by lower 
federal courts and law journal articles.  Recent commentators have 
read Klein both too broadly and narrowly.  Its central holding is that 
Congress may not grant federal courts jurisdiction to decide a set of 
cases on the merits while depriving them of jurisdiction to apply 
specified parts of the Constitution in reaching their decisions.  Read 
through the proper interpretive lens, Klein has a great deal more to say 
than this, indeed a great deal more than I thought or expressed in 1981 
in the earliest comprehensive article on the case.  By means of the law 
of judgments and preclusion, Klein is best explained by Congress’s lack 
of power to simultaneously court-strip the state as well as the federal 
courts of the power to enforce constitutional rights.  Despite my earlier 
doubts and some new Klein scholarship that would read it more 
narrowly, Klein can best be read as more broadly prohibiting statutory 
interference with federal courts’ processes of fact-finding and their 
methods of both constitutional and statutory interpretation.  These 
attractive readings of Klein call into question one federal post-
conviction habeas corpus statute and, possibly, parts of the War on 
Terror that restrict the courts’ use of foreign and international law, 
including the Geneva Conventions.  Some recent scholarship seems to 
read Klein too narrowly as placing no restrictions on Congress’s power 
to control how federal courts interpret statutes.  Other recent 
scholarship reads it too broadly.  The latter takes its prohibitions far 
beyond protection of federal courts’ decision processes, seeing in Klein 
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Nardone.  Andrew Johnston provided excellent research assistance on an earlier draft.  I greatly 
appreciate the expert help of Susan Herrick and Susan McCarty of the School of Law’s Thurgood 
Marshall Law Library. 
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a holding that prohibits otherwise constitutional legislation on grounds 
that it would deceive the public.  This attributed holding seems an 
unfortunate one.  It would task courts with the job of requiring 
reasonable truth in legislation.  That is a job that neither the Court at 
the time of Klein, nor the current Supreme Court, would relish or would 
be likely to find required of it by the Constitution.  Beyond these issues, 
this Article explores the connections between Klein’s central holding 
against treating federal courts as puppets and the perennial debate 
about court-stripping; specifically, Congress’s power simply to exclude 
classes of constitutional claims from federal court enforcement. 
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[T]hese difficult objects, dilapidate 
Appearances of what appearances, 
Words, lines, not meanings, not communications 
Dark things without a double, after all** 
INTRODUCTION 
Arising out of the Civil War and Reconstruction politics, United 
States v. Klein1 is both a product of and a case for tumultuous times.2  It 
is one of only two U.S. Supreme Court cases to invalidate a 
congressional regulation of federal courts’ jurisdiction as a violation of 
the judicial independence required by Article III of the Constitution.3  
Klein has been cited in thirty-three U.S. Supreme Court opinions and 
roughly five hundred times each by lower courts and law journal 
articles.4  The opinion in its context has been a frequent object of 
 
 ** WALLACE STEVENS, An Ordinary Evening in New Haven, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF 
WALLACE STEVENS 465, 465 (Vintage Books 1990) (1923). 
1. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).  Klein struck a provision of a statute 
that required the Supreme Court to hear appeals but reverse any judgments in appellees’ favor 
that were based on presidential pardons, without making inquiries into the substantive 
constitutional merits of the case.  Id. at 140–48.  For fuller treatments of Klein, see discussion 
infra Part I.  See generally Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts 
Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1189 [hereinafter 
Young, Klein Revisited].  
2. Howard M. Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, the War on Terror, and United States v. 
Klein, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 211, 215–18 (2011) [hereinafter Wasserman, 
Constitutional Pathology] (arguing that Klein was a product of pathological political times and 
discussing its current application amidst the strains of the War on Terror).  
3. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 320 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009).  In recent times, the Court has 
struck down court-stripping provisions, but not as violations of Article III.  In Boumediene v. 
Bush, the Court found that the limited judicial review permitted to detainees at Guantanamo 
violated the Constitution’s provisions against suspension of habeas corpus.  553 U.S. 723, 792 
(2008).  Furthermore, in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, the Court struck a provision similar to 
the one struck in Klein but on due process grounds.  481 U.S. 828, 840 (1987).  The invalidated 
provision required a federal district court to preside over a conviction while, for all functional 
purposes, making it impossible for the court to consider the defendant’s plausible constitutional 
defense.  See id. at 839. 
4. These statistics are based upon a Shepard’s Report in LexisNexis of United States v. Klein, 
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).  Klein is cited in 457 federal (non-Supreme Court) and state court 
decisions and in 561 law journal articles.  The first serious scholarship covering Klein was a brief 
interpretation in Henry Hart’s famous Dialogue.  Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to 
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 
1372–73 (1953).  The earliest comprehensive coverage of Klein can be found in Young, Klein 
Revisited, supra note 1, at 1189–262.  See also James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some 
Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 696, 773–75 (1998) (describing how a qualitative understanding of the judicial 
power helps explain Klein’s holding); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—
Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the 
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interpretation and, in the words of the Wallace Stevens epigram, a 
difficult one.  In recent years, Klein has been the focus of a new wave of 
scholarly interest.5  The opinion has been described as creating a 
“myth” and (with more justification) confusing.6  But Klein has one 
very clear meaning and important holding: It makes clear that 
Congress’s powers to regulate jurisdiction are not powers to override 
Marbury v. Madison by other means.7  In short, even if Congress enjoys 
a great deal of authority to close federal courts to specified claims, it 
cannot open them only to use them as puppets. 
In Klein, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that would have 
forced it to take jurisdiction over a government appeal from an adverse 
Court of Claims judgment.8  The statute purported to give the Court 
only the power to issue a judgment reversing the lower court’s 
judgment.9  These provisions deprived the Court of the power to 
consider whether the pardon provisions of the Constitution required 
affirming the judgment below.10  Accordingly, Klein held that if federal 
courts are permitted jurisdiction to decide a case, then they must have 
freedom to apply all relevant federal law, giving hierarchical priority to 
constitutional law over statutes and other lesser forms.11  Klein itself 
says nothing directly about the perennial federal court-stripping 
debate—whether Congress can remove sets of constitutional cases 
entirely from federal courts’ jurisdiction based on displeasure with the 
rights asserted.  Nonetheless, Klein is related to that debate in several 
 
Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 64, 68 (1981) (examining Klein’s impact on Congress’s 
authority to limit federal court jurisdiction).  For a brief summary of Klein and its significance, 
not reflecting my most recent views, see Gordon G. Young, United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 
(1872), in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 109, 109–10 
(David S. Tanenhaus ed., 2008) [hereinafter Young, U.S. v. Klein]. 
5. The most general of these is Howard M. Wasserman, The Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 
U. CIN. L. REV. 53 (2010) [hereinafter Wasserman, Irrepressible Myth].  Dealing with Klein and 
the War on Terror are Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, supra note 2, at 214–15; and, more 
generally, Louis Fisher, United States v. Klein: Judging Its Clarity and Application, 5 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 237 (2011), and Stephen I. Vladeck, Why Klein (Still) Matters: 
Congressional Deception and the War on Terrorism, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 251 
(2011). 
6. See, e.g., Wasserman, Irrepressible Myth, supra note 5, at 53–58, 64–65 (describing Klein 
as creating a myth and confusing, respectively); Young, Klein Revisited, supra note 1, at 1194–97 
(dealing with the great confusion as to the meaning of Klein). 
7. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803) (striking down portions of 
a statute read to assign the Supreme Court original jurisdiction but conflicting with limitations on 
Supreme Court jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution). 
8. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147–48 (1872). 
9. Id. at 148. 
10. See discussion infra Part I.A.1. 
11. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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ways.12  First, a little-known companion case seems to strike down a 
court-stripping statute, one that simply closes the federal courts to 
specified claims.13  Second, Klein’s prohibition against Congress’s use 
of federal courts as puppets turns out to be, via the law of claim 
preclusion, the fraternal twin of a much more severe form of court-
stripping: one that attempts to close both federal and state courts to 
specified constitutional claims.14 
Congress attempted dual state and federal court-stripping in the Fair 
Labor Standards Act; the Second Circuit, during its illustrious Learned 
Hand years, determined that the practice was unconstitutional.15  
Indeed, Henry Hart’s foundational writings in federal court studies 
make a compelling case against dual system court-stripping.16  
Additionally, three Supreme Court cases in the 1970s and 1980s, at a 
minimum, interpret statutes to avoid confronting the constitutionality of 
such laws.17  But at a maximum (and not discussed in any scholarly 
literature), those cases—though not Klein itself—may be read more 
broadly as condemning simple single system, federal trial court-
stripping.18 
I first explored Klein, its one clear holding, and its considerable 
difficulties in a 1981 article.19  Partially based on the influence of 
Ronald Dworkin’s writings,20 I now would attribute additional, more 
general holdings to Klein, radiating out like the circles on a bull’s eye 
target.21  The Court’s opinion in Klein may be read, at some higher but 
reasonable level of generality, to prohibit a variety of restrictions on 
federal courts’ deliberative processes.  These additional restrictions 
prohibit some statutory regulation of the methods of finding facts; they 
also prohibit some statutory regulation of the methods of interpreting 
 
12. See discussion infra Part I.D. 
13. See Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 154–56 (1871) (reversing a 
dismissal of Armstrong’s claim against the United States for money damages and remanding for a 
decision on the merits despite a statute requiring dismissal).  See also discussion infra Part I.E.3. 
14. See discussion infra Part I.D (arguing that puppeteering regulations would accomplish the 
same result as dual system court-stripping). 
15. See discussion infra Part I.E.1 (discussing Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.). 
16. See discussion infra Part I.D.1 (arguing that state courts must be available when federal 
courts are not). 
17. See discussion infra Part I.E.2 (discussing cases that closed federal courts to specified 
constitutional claims and did not make clear the ability of state courts to hear the claims). 
18. See discussion infra Part I.E.2 (explaining that a broad reading of the cases would reveal 
that only federal, and not state courts, were discussed in the applicable court opinions). 
19. See generally Young, Klein Revisited, supra note 1, at 1197–262. 
20. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).  For more on Dworkin’s 
writings, see supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
21. See also infra discussion Part II.B. 
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the Constitution, and even some, though not all, statutory limitations on 
courts’ methods and tools for reading statutes.22  These readings of 
Article III, through Klein’s lens, raise questions about the 
constitutionality of portions of the statutory superstructure of the War 
on Terror,23 which may attempt, in certain contexts, to cut federal 
courts off from using the Geneva Conventions even for inspiration and 
analogy in interpreting statutes.24 
This view of Klein also has implications for portions of federal 
statutes, which hamstring the decision processes of federal courts when 
exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the constitutional 
validity of state court criminal convictions.25  More concretely, a 
broader reading of Klein raises questions about the soundness of the 
majority’s constitutional and statutory interpretations in Williams v. 
Taylor.26  In Williams, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that it 
interpreted as requiring lower federal courts, while exercising habeas 
corpus jurisdiction, to defer to some federal constitutional 
interpretations by state courts, even though the federal habeas corpus 
courts thought them incorrect.27 
The title of this Article—United States v. Klein, Then and Now— has 
a double meaning.  “Then” refers both to what we know about Klein 
itself at birth and to my original perspectives, including previously 
unpublished commentary on my view of Armstrong v. United States.  
“Now” refers to a much more recent rethinking of some aspects of Klein 
prompted both by recent articles on Klein and by a new perspective on 
how lawyers and judges ought to read and interpret cases. 
 
22. See discussion infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing concerns in protecting federal courts’ 
decisional processes). 
23. For a brief general description of the War on Terror and its relation to the Guantanamo 
Bay detention facility and other similar sites, see Jonathan Hafetz, Military Detention in the “War 
on Terrorism”: Normalizing the Exceptional after 9/11, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31, 31–32 
(2012). 
24. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing limitations on Congress’s power to control 
the methods courts use to interpret laws). 
25. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the effects habeas corpus has on courts’ judicial 
functions). 
26. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (ignoring arguments presented based on 
Klein, and thus upholding requirements that federal judges, in habeas corpus proceedings brought 
by convicted state prisoners, defer to readings of the federal Constitution made by state courts in 
preserving convictions).  
27. See infra part II.B.3 (discussing the justifications for requiring, in some cases, that a 
federal habeas corpus court defer to state court interpretations of the Constitution).  
ARTICLES_5_YOUNG.DOCX 11/9/2012  12:30 PM 
272 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
I. KLEIN THEN 
A. Two Forms of Jurisdictional Regulation 
1. Puppeteering Regulations 
The first form of jurisdictional regulation considered in this Article 
normally has an effect that is very different from court-stripping, which 
is simply closing lower federal courts to specified claims.28  This 
contrasting form of regulation does not attempt to close the federal 
courts, but rather, to use them as puppets to reach substantively 
unconstitutional results dictated by Congress.29  More specifically, it 
attempts to use its powers to regulate courts’ jurisdiction to compel the 
courts to issue judgments on the merits that would otherwise be 
constitutionally impermissible.  Any argument for the constitutionality 
of such laws would have to be founded on the premise that Congress’s 
powers over federal courts’ jurisdiction in some way trump substantive 
personal constitutional entitlements.  Klein itself invalidated a complex 
instance of this form of regulation. 
Such regulation is problematic only in the case of statutes that 
attempt to use jurisdictional powers to prevent enforcement of 
constitutional rights.  Courts must accept Congress’s instructions about 
how to enforce statutory rights except in the unusual circumstances in 
which the Constitution interferes.30 
This is easiest to understand through two hypothetical examples.  
Imagine a statute that permits federal district courts to conduct the trials 
of those accused of a particular federal statutory speech offense—e.g., 
some sort of incitement to violence—but which purported to withhold 
jurisdiction from those courts to consider the defendants’ First 
Amendment challenges to the parts of the statute defining the crime.  
Or, to take a purely civil version, one might imagine a statute that left 
untouched federal district courts’ diversity jurisdiction but purported to 
deprive them of jurisdiction to consider the effect of the First 
 
28. See discussion infra Part I.A.2 (arguing that court-stripping often takes the form of 
statutory exclusion from lower federal courts of specified cases or claims to relief based on 
constitutional rights, seeking to prevent the enforcement of these rights against the government 
and its officers). 
29. Young, Klein Revisited, supra note 1, at 1221.  See also J. Richard Doidge, Note, Is 
Purely Retroactive Legislation Limited by Separation of Powers?: Rethinking United States v. 
Klein, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 910, 959–61, 974 (1994) (describing Klein in such terms).   
30. That courts must give effect to constitutionally valid statutes is basic.  Perhaps the clearest 
illustration of this principle is that if the new statute that is itself constitutionally valid changes the 
result in a case on appeal, the court must apply the new statute.  See United States v. Schooner 
Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109–10 (1801); FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 88. 
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Amendment in reaching decisions in state law libel cases.31  These are 
simplified versions of the pattern of regulation condemned in Klein.  
Henry Hart saw Klein’s holding as a prohibition against this sort of 
regulation of federal courts.32 
Klein itself is a rather unusual case, but, as Hart noted, the statute that 
it invalidated exemplifies puppeteering laws.33  Klein started as an 
action in the Court of Claims to recover compensation from the United 
States Treasury for property seized from Victor Wilson by the Union 
Army during the Civil War (1861–1865).34  Under an 1863 federal 
statute, those innocent of collaborating with the Confederacy were 
entitled to sue in that court for compensation.35  Although Wilson had 
collaborated with the Confederacy, he was one of many who received a 
general pardon from President Abraham Lincoln.  Klein was the 
administrator of Wilson’s estate.36  He sued the United States in the 
Court of Claims shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court held, in a previous 
case, that pardoned Confederate collaborators were legally innocent, at 
least for purposes of recovering property under the 1863 statute.37  On 
the basis of this precedent, the Court of Claims awarded Wilson’s estate 
more than $125,000 in 1869.38 
The decision angered Radical Republicans in Congress who 
successfully pushed through an 1870 statute aimed at Wilson and other 
despised collaborators who had won lower court judgments based on 
pardons.39  The portions of the 1870 act bearing on Klein required the 
Supreme Court to hear the federal government’s appeals of such 
awards, but it purported to deny the Supreme Court jurisdiction to 
consider pardon rights in deciding those appeals.40  These provisions 
would have required a reversal of the judgment in Wilson’s favor, 
without full judicial consideration of whether he was constitutionally 
entitled to a favorable judgment.  The Supreme Court struck this down 
and affirmed the Court of Claims, stating in part: 
 
31. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (recognizing a 
constitutional defense against libel suits for those who make innocent or negligent mistakes of 
fact in criticizing public officials). 
32. See Hart, supra note 4, at 1398–99. 
33. Id. at 1373 & n.39. 
34. Young, Klein Revisited, supra note 1, at 1197–99. 
35. Id. at 1197–99. 
36. Id. at 1198–99. 
37. Id. at 1198–99, 1201–03. 
38. Id. at 1199. 
39. Id. at 1203–05. 
40. Id. at 1206–09. 
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If [the 1870 Act] simply denied the right of appeal in a particular class 
of cases, there could be no doubt that it must be regarded as an 
exercise of the power of Congress to make ‘such exceptions from the 
appellate jurisdiction’ as should seem to it expedient. 
 But the language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not 
intend to withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end. 
Its great and controlling purpose is to deny to pardons granted by the 
President the effect which this court had adjudged them to have.  The 
proviso declares that pardons shall not be considered by this court on 
appeal. . . . 
. . . . 
 It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged 
power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the 
appellate power. . . . 
. . . . 
 We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit 
which separates the legislative from the judicial power.41 
It is worth noting that the Court’s emphasis in this central passage is 
two-fold—pardon rights and judicial power.  The concern in Klein 
seems to be on how thwarting separate constitutional limits in this 
jurisdictional manner goes beyond its permissible control of the judicial 
power.  Thus, by its general reference to incursions on the “judicial 
power,” Klein’s concerns seem to extend to protection of federal courts 
in general and not simply the Supreme Court. 
2. Court-Stripping Regulations 
The second of the two forms of regulation that this Article considers 
is widely referred to as “court-stripping” or “jurisdiction-stripping” 
legislation.42  Often, this sort of regulation takes the form of the 
statutory exclusion from lower federal courts of specified cases or 
affirmative claims to relief based on constitutional rights.43  Such laws 
 
41. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145–47 (1872). 
42. For an early use of the term, see Max Baucus & Kenneth R. Kay, The Court-Stripping 
Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REV. 988, 992–94 
(1982) (defining “court-stripping” as various attempts to selectively remove federal court 
jurisdiction over constitutional claims).  For more recent examples of the use of this term, see 
Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 
874 n.12, 890–91, 896–97 (2011) (referring to such laws as “jurisdiction-stripping”); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 413, 434 n.98 (2007) (explaining decisional independence in relation to court-
stripping legislation). 
43. With certain exceptions, the Norris-La Guardia Act deprived federal courts of jurisdiction 
to issue injunctions in labor disputes.  In Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S 323 (1938), the 
Supreme Court seemed, in remanding a case, to require the district court to dismiss despite the 
possibilities that the injunction sought to enforce previous Supreme Court-declared constitutional 
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single out congressionally unpopular constitutional rights and seek to 
prevent their enforcement in federal courts against the government and 
its officers.  Some examples include laws or proposed laws removing 
from federal courts the power to enforce arguably vested property 
rights, abortion rights, or rights against school prayer.44  In this 
category, one might also include restrictions on judicial review of the 
confinement of enemy combatants at Guantanamo,45 although those 
cases also raise issues of violation of the more specific right that habeas 
corpus not be suspended except in circumstances narrowly defined by 
the Constitution.46 
In one common form, court-stripping simply closes the federal trial 
courts to plaintiffs who seek judicial assistance against unconstitutional 
action—e.g., a suit seeking an injunction to stop a threatened arrest on 
grounds that the First Amendment protects the plaintiff’s proposed 
activities.  A paired example of a court-stripping law is one that would 
excise such suits from federal district courts’ generally broad 
jurisdiction over federal questions.47  But one might substitute laws 
aimed at Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights or any other rights 
springing from the Constitution.  The result in these examples, and 
 
rights.  The Court said in remanding: “There can be no question of the power of Congress thus to 
define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States.”  Id. at 330.  It is 
possible, however, to read Lauf as finding the exceptions to the withdrawal of jurisdiction 
sufficient to permit enforcement of any substantive constitutional rights.  Gordon G. Young, A 
Critical Reassessment of the Case Law Bearing on Congress’s Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction 
of the Lower Federal Courts, 54 MD. L. REV. 132, 168–69 (1995) [hereinafter Young, Congress’s 
Power to Restrict].  For a description of myriad, less successful attempts to withdraw jurisdiction 
over congressionally unpopular court-declared constitutional rights—including rights to abortion 
and busing for racial balance—see FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 277–78; Grove, supra note 
42, at 900–16. 
44. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 277. 
45. See Hafetz, supra note 23, at 32 (“Among the features that distinguish this system [of 
military detention and prosecution] from the criminal justice system are fewer procedural 
safeguards afforded detainees, the significantly lower evidentiary burden imposed on the 
government, heightened secrecy, fewer constraints on interrogations, more limited judicial 
review, and the open-ended nature of the confinement itself.”). 
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
Provisions insulating from full judicial review the detention of “enemy non-combatants” have 
been seen as a special case of court-stripping.  Benjamin G. Davis, No Third Class Processes for 
Foreigners, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 88, 90, 94 (2008).  In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court, for the first 
time, found unconstitutional a federal statute that provided limited and exclusive judicial review 
to Guantanamo detainees on grounds that it violated the Suspension Clause.  553 U.S. 723, 792 
(2008).  While the reasoning relied on the Suspension Clause, the opinion says nothing about 
limitations on judicial review for non-habeas corpus claims to review unconstitutional action and 
laws; that is, those limitations allegedly depriving a would-be plaintiff of a federal court forum.  
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (providing general federal trial court jurisdiction over cases 
“arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States.”). 
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generally under a court-stripping law, would be a dismissal for want of 
jurisdiction, not on the merits.  Normally, and perhaps always, simple 
stripping of federal trial court jurisdiction leaves state courts free to hear 
constitutionally based claims.48 
B. Sources of Congress’s Power to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts 
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution sets forth the nine categories 
of cases, including federal question and state citizen diversity cases, 
over which the federal courts may preside if Congress chooses to grant 
them jurisdiction.49  It provides that in two such categories the Supreme 
Court shall have trial jurisdiction and, in the other seven, appellate 
jurisdiction.  Article III, Section 2 further provides: 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court 
shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before 
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both 
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations 
as the Congress shall make.50 
The emphasized portion of this provision is the source of Congress’s 
powers over the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  Certain 
Supreme Court case law and commentary suggest that Congress can 
eliminate Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over any category of 
cases it wishes to exclude, even those to enforce constitutional rights it 
finds inconvenient.51  But there are contrary indications and arguments 
 
48. See infra Part I.D.1. 
49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between 
two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens 
of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants 
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects. 
50. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).  On the surface, it is unclear whether this 
power to make exceptions and regulations touches only the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction, or whether such power allows or perhaps requires reciprocal adjustment of the 
powers of the lower federal courts versus those of the Supreme Court to assure that some federal 
court has jurisdiction over federal law cases.  See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of 
Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 216 (1985) 
(arguing, based on the language and structure of the Constitution, that either the Supreme Court, a 
lower federal court, or both courts, must be available to hear cases arising under the Constitution, 
laws and treaties of the United States, and certain other categories of the federal judicial power). 
51. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (dismissing an appeal of a trial 
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that Congress may not simply discriminate against unpopular rights.52 
Congress’s powers to restrict, and otherwise regulate, the jurisdiction 
of the lower federal courts has a less clear textual basis.  The 
Constitution vests the federal judicial power in one Supreme Court and 
“in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”53  The use of the word “may” was no mistake but 
instead reflected a compromise at the Constitutional Convention, 
generally referred to as the “Madisonian Compromise,” that avoided 
either requiring or prohibiting the existence of lower federal courts.54  
As a result, Congress was free not to establish lower federal courts.  
However, unlike its provisions for regulation of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction, the Constitution makes no explicit provisions for statutory 
exceptions to or regulations of the jurisdiction of lower federal courts 
that Congress does choose to establish.55 
Despite the absence of explicit provisions for regulation, Article III 
has been read as implicitly providing Congress a great deal of power to 
give any lower federal courts (that it does create) as little or as much of 
the jurisdiction on the Article III’s list as it wishes to give.  This reading 
rests on the theory that the power to create lower federal courts implies 
the power to regulate them.56  Over the years, however, in a variety of 
cases the Court’s dicta about the extent of Congress’s jurisdictional 
powers went much further than allowing Congress a choice of federal 
enforcement of all or of no federal law claims.57 
Read literally, the Court’s dicta permitted Congress to grant 
jurisdiction generally to federal trial courts in cases turning on federal 
questions but to withhold in it cases that sought enforcement of some 
 
court’s refusal to grant habeas relief for a constitutional claim to liberty because Congress had 
repealed the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction).  On the details and ambiguities of 
McCardle, see William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 
229, 248–52, 254–60 (1973).  
52. Any question about the extent of such powers would be resolved either by a reading of the 
“exceptions and regulations” language in Article III or a finding that later provisions of the 
Constitution—e.g., the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—placed further 
limits not necessarily implicit in the Constitution as of 1789.  See Hart, supra note 4, at 1364–65 
(suggesting that McCardle’s statements of plenary congressional power are dicta and that there 
may be structural limits on Congress’s power under the Exceptions Clause to exclude 
constitutional claims from consideration by the Supreme Court).  
53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
54. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 7–9. 
55. The Constitution authorizes Congress to “constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme 
Court.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
56. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.  For the first eighty-six years under the 
Constitution there was no general federal question jurisdiction, except for a period of months 
around 1801.  FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 743–45. 
57. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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congressionally disfavored federal constitutional right.58  The logic of 
these Supreme Court statements is based on the generally, though not 
always, true proposition that a broad power includes any combination of 
its specifics.59  The argument was that Congress’s clear power over the 
existence of any lower federal courts includes the lesser power to create 
them with whatever jurisdictional limitations Congress chooses to 
impose.  The following quote represents the earliest (and fullest) 
Supreme Court statement of this position, made in 1845, and often 
reiterated by the Court favorably in subsequent years: 
[T]he doctrines so often ruled in this court that the judicial power of 
the United States, although it has its origin in the Constitution, is . . . 
dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of 
its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole 
power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) for the 
exercise of the judicial power, and of investing them with jurisdiction 
either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding 
jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to 
Congress may seem proper for the public good.60 
C. Henry Hart’s Position 
Henry Hart was a co-founder of modern federal court studies and of 
the legal process school of legal analysis.61  He wrote the foundational 
analysis of Congress’s jurisdictional powers over both state and federal 
courts.62  Hart sharply contrasts puppeteering regulations with ordinary 
 
58. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.  
59. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545–48 (1985) (concluding 
that government’s option to create certain contract rights does not include the option to control 
the process required in factual disputes over the rights created).  Thus, not all conditions on 
government largesse comply with the Constitution.  See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989) (describing and theorizing about 
the constitutionality of various sorts of conditions on government largesse). 
60. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845) (footnote omitted).  The remainder of 
the passage reads as follows: 
To deny this position would be to elevate the judicial over the legislative branch of the 
government, and to give to the former powers limited by its own discretion merely.  It 
follows, then, that the courts created by statute must look to the statute as the warrant 
for their authority, certainly they cannot go beyond the statute, and assert an authority 
with which they may not be invested by it, or which may be clearly denied to them.  
Id.  This was quoted in part in the dicta of Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943).  
Lockerty’s statement was dicta on court-stripping because the Court simply upheld an application 
of a provision that specified which particular trial court was available for plaintiff’s claim and did 
not conclude that all federal trial courts could have been closed to that claim. 
61. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
953, 954–64 (1994) (describing Henry Hart along with his coauthor Albert Sachs and their 
forerunner Felix Frankfurter). 
62. Hart, supra note 4, at 1363–65. 
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federal court-stripping.  As to simple court-stripping laws, he backs off 
any strong position that they are unconstitutional: 
 Q. . . . But suppose Congress is in dead earnest about withdrawing 
general jurisdiction in a special class of cases arising under the 
Constitution.  Do you mean that it could only accomplish that by 
repealing Section 1331 [the federal question jurisdictional grant] in 
toto, on the theory that a mere amendment might be declared 
unconstitutional and the prior Section 1331 then left free to operate? 
. . . 
 A. Well now, I’ll have to stall a little. Habeas corpus aside, I’d 
hesitate to say that Congress couldn’t effect an unconstitutional 
withdrawal of jurisdiction—that is, a withdrawal to effectuate 
unconstitutional purposes—if it really wanted to.63 
But for Hart, opening federal courts to cases, but allowing them to 
function only as Congress’s puppets, clearly exceeds a constitutional 
limit he recognized in Klein’s reading of Article III: “[I]f Congress 
directs an Article III court to decide a case, I can easily read into Article 
III a limitation on the power of Congress to tell the court how to decide 
it. . . . [T]he Court itself made [that point] clear long ago in United 
States v. Klein.”64 
Hart never explains his powerful intuition that this is the best reading 
of Klein or that puppeteering laws are more clearly unconstitutional 
than laws that simply remove jurisdiction from the lower federal courts 
to enforce specified constitutional rights.  Later, this Article offers 
reasons for reading Klein in this manner.65  The most forceful argument 
for this interpretation is based on the law of claim and issue preclusion 
and powerfully supports such a reading of Klein and the Constitution.66 
D. What Makes Court Puppeteering Especially Pernicious: Dual System 
Court-Stripping and Puppeteering as Fraternal Twins 
Klein does not turn on special attributes of the Supreme Court but 
 
63. Id. at 1398–99 (footnote omitted).  From one perspective, Hart’s use of the word 
“unconstitutional” might support the view that he considered court-stripping unconstitutional, at 
least in some very limited sense of what is constitutionally proper.  But he did not postulate that 
the courts are physically closed, so presumably they could declare that such limits are 
unconstitutional; ignore them; and hear the statutorily excluded cases.  As I read this passage, 
Hart thought that simple federal court-stripping statutes, aimed at unpopular rights, were within 
Congress’s powers under the Constitution, but regrettable in terms of constitutional values.  
64. Id. at 1373. 
65. See infra Part I.D (arguing that state courts must be available to constitutional claims and 
Congress cannot foreclose that option from potential claimants). 
66. See discussion infra Part I.D.2 (arguing that puppeteering prevents litigants from having 
their day in court even more effectively than the troubling dual system court-stripping). 
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rather on the independent status of Article III courts more generally.67  
So what makes puppeteering the clearly more pernicious form of 
jurisdictional regulation?  Hart never articulates his reasons for taking 
that position. 
The most powerful support resides in the way that the law of 
judgments and preclusion magnify the harm of a dismissal on the 
merits, so that it leads, in effect, to the destruction of a constitutional 
claim.68  There are other reasons that puppeteering is much more 
pernicious than ordinary federal court-stripping, including bad 
symbolism denigrating the status of the Article III courts and perhaps a 
certain sort of deception on the electorate concerning the existence of 
independent courts.69 
The main argument has two steps.  The first is the unconstitutionality 
of Congress’s use of its jurisdictional powers to exclude enforcement of 
court-declared constitutional rights from both the state and federal 
courts.  The second is the near identity of puppeteering to such dual 
system court-stripping. 
1. The Unconstitutionality of Dual System Court-Stripping Laws 
 A. I’ve given all the important answers to that question, haven’t I?  
I would have thought the rest was clear.  Why, it’s been clear ever 
since September 17, 1787. 
 Q. Not to me. 
 
67. Hart sees in Klein a proposition about what Congress cannot do to “an Article III court”: 
[I]f Congress directs an Article III court to decide a case, I can easily read into Article 
III a limitation on the power of Congress to tell the court how to decide it. [Justice] 
Rutledge makes that point clearly in the Yakus case, as the Court itself made it clear 
long ago in United States v. Klein. 
Hart, supra note 4, at 1373. 
68. See infra Part I.D.2 (arguing that state courts can still hear claims stripped from federal 
courts because they will simply have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, whereas 
puppeteering is more dangerous because it prevents claims from ever being adjudicated, as they 
will have been precluded). 
69. There is some force to the unelaborated argument that the negative symbolism of treating 
a supposedly independent branch of the federal government as an instrument of another is a 
constitutional violation.  Most separation of powers checks—e.g., the President’s veto or the 
Senate’s power not to consent to appointments and treaties—are negative.  There is no pure 
example of an inter-branch check allowing one branch to take over the function of another.  The 
closest imperfect one is the judicial-style power involved in impeachments.  One analogy here is 
the Court’s federalism jurisprudence, prohibiting Congress from using coercion to make state 
legislatures enact, as state law, federal programs or to make state executive officers enforce 
federal programs.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (striking down portions 
of federal handgun regulation that imposed duties on local sheriffs); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (striking down a federal law that penalized states for not enacting 
specified federal policy into state law). 
ARTICLES_5_YOUNG.DOCX 11/9/2012  12:30 PM 
2012] United States v. Klein, Then and Now 281 
 A. The state courts.  In the scheme of the Constitution, they are the 
primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases they 
may be the ultimate ones.  If they were to fail, and if Congress had 
taken away the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and been 
upheld in doing so, then we really would be sunk. 
 Q. But Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of state courts, too, in 
federal matters. 
 A. Congress can’t do it unconstitutionally.  The state courts always 
have a general jurisdiction to fall back on.  And the Supremacy Clause 
binds them to exercise that jurisdiction in accordance with the 
Constitution.70 
Thus, Hart’s view is that state courts are available as backstops to 
hear any viable constitutional claim that is excluded from federal trial 
courts by court-stripping laws.  Admittedly, case law clearly permits 
Congress to deny state courts’ jurisdiction over federal statutory 
claims71—best seen as an exercise of Congress’s power to do that 
which is necessary and proper to make its regulatory laws work well.  
Therefore, laws granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts to 
hear certain claims under federal statutes (e.g., certain federal securities 
laws) are justifiable under legislative powers granted in Article I, 
Section 8 (most often the Commerce Clause as augmented by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause).72  This power to make statutory claims 
exclusively cognizable in federal courts is well-settled in case law73 and 
entails at least some power to limit the jurisdiction of state courts.74 
 
70. Hart, supra note 4, at 1401 (footnote omitted). 
71. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–61 (1990) (recognizing that federal statutes which 
create causes of action can explicitly or implicitly restrict their enforcement to the federal courts 
by clearly excluding state court jurisdiction).  However, civil RICO actions are not explicitly so 
limited and do not meet the strict requirements for implication of exclusion of concurrent state 
court enforcement.  Id. at 461. 
72. Article I, Section 1 begins: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.  The powers mentioned in the text appear in the 
following paragraphs: “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  Id. § 8, cl. 3.  The last paragraph of section eight reads: “To 
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, 
or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  Id. § 8, cl. 18.  These sections make it clear that the 
larger scale ends or means explicitly specified are augmented by those reasonably necessary to 
their achievement.  As long as any augmentation does not violate the Constitution in other ways, 
it too, though not specifically mentioned, is within Congress’s powers to legislate.  See 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (finding that Congress has the 
implicit power to create a bank in order to pursue explicitly given powers and proclaiming: “Let 
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional”).   
73. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
74. Id. at 464. 
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If backed by such powers, statutes are constitutional so long as they 
do not run afoul of more specific limits on governments, usually 
individual rights provisions.  Of the latter, rational basis equal 
protection and rational basis due process law cover the entire field of 
regulation.  These schemes usually provide very few limits on 
legislative action.  In limited circumstances, however, they are beefed 
up to provide even stricter scrutiny.75 
Under the strict scrutiny test, as well as under the generally weak 
rational basis test, a statute that can be explained only as pursuing an 
illegitimate end is per se unconstitutional.76  Moreover, if Congress 
closes both sets of courts—state and federal—to specified claims of 
constitutional rights, its aim can only be understood as that of making 
unenforceable a right that Congress has no power to repeal directly.  
Certainly it would be doublespeak to treat this as legislation augmenting 
the “enforcement” of such a right.  Such a law is neither justified by any 
explicit federal jurisdictional power authorizing control over state courts 
(because there are no such powers) or “necessary” in pursuit of any 
regulatory power authorized under Article I (because constitutional 
rights are neither created, nor generally adjustable, by statutes).77  It is 
an end completely at odds with the existence and nature of the rights 
themselves. 
This all seems simple, and yet it substantiates Hart’s unelaborated 
view that state courts must be available as backstops.  Indeed, there are 
impressive cases that either support this view of the unconstitutionality 
of dual system court-stripping or call its validity into question.78  When 
 
75. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
§ 6.5 (4th ed. 2011) (defining and explaining the levels of scrutiny used to determine the 
constitutionality of laws). 
76. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 
1133–34 (2010) (“[L]egislation enacted with the aim of inviting state courts to defy applicable 
Supreme Court precedent is not necessary and proper to any constitutionally legitimate purpose 
and should be held unconstitutional on that basis.”); Young, U.S. v. Klein, supra note 4, at 109–
10 (making this argument in a highly compact way).  See generally Gordon G. Young, 
Jurisdiction Stripping, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 95, 
98 (David S. Tanenhaus ed., 2008) [hereinafter Young, Jurisdiction Stripping] (arguing that dual 
state-federal court-stripping flounders as based on unconstitutional motives); Gordon G. Young, 
Justifying Motive Analysis in Judicial Review, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 191 (2008) 
[hereinafter Young, Motive Analysis] (discussing the role of illegitimate motives in legislation); 
Young, U.S. v. Klein, supra note 4, at 109–10 (arguing that, via the law of preclusion, 
puppeteering regulations such as the one struck in Klein exclude plaintiffs’ constitutional claims 
from both sets of courts, state and federal). 
77. But see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (granting Congress the power to legislate to enforce 
the Thirteenth Amendment); id. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting Congress the power to legislate to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); id. amend. XV, § 2 (granting Congress the power to enforce 
the Fifteenth Amendment).  
78. See discussion infra Parts II.E.1–3 (discussing in detail the arguably jurisdiction-stripping 
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considered together with the law of claim preclusion, the 
unconstitutionality of dual system court-stripping seemingly condemns 
puppeteering. 
2. The Law of Preclusion and the Equivalence of Puppeteering to Dual 
State and Federal Court-Stripping 
The most significant concrete difference between court-stripping and 
puppeteering regulations is in the sort of judicial judgment that each 
law, if constitutional, would compel a court to enter.  A court-stripping 
law results in a dismissal for want of jurisdiction, not one on the 
merits.79  It shuts a plaintiff seeking to enforce constitutional rights out 
of a federal trial court, but it has no preclusive effect on the plaintiff’s 
claim on the merits.  In most such cases, state courts are open to enforce 
the claim (subject to the usual defenses).80 
Further, if the state courts are open to a constitutional claim, then the 
claim has not been extinguished but simply burdened by loss of an 
alternative forum.  One can argue, as does Laurence Tribe, that in some 
cases such a burden is itself unconstitutional.81  Below, this Article 
examines cases that may have held court-stripping laws 
unconstitutional.82  However, the unconstitutionality of such laws is 
highly debatable. 
 
statutes involved in four Supreme Court cases—Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988); Bowen v. 
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 
(1974); Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1871)—and one Court of Appeals 
case—Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948)).   
79. See Okoro v. Bohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] jurisdictional dismissal 
precludes only the relitigation of the ground of that dismissal, and thus has collateral estoppel 
(issue preclusion) effect rather than the broader res judicata effect . . . .”); 18 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4436 (2d ed. 2012) (“Civil Rule 41(b) 
provides that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue does not operate as an 
adjudication upon the merits.  This provision means only that the dismissal permits a second 
action on the same claim that corrects the deficiency found in the first action.  The judgment 
remains effective to preclude relitigation of the precise issue of jurisdiction or venue that led to 
the initial dismissal.  The basic rule that dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction does not 
preclude a second action on the same claim is well settled.” (footnotes omitted)).  See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(1)(a) (1982) (“A personal judgment for the 
defendant, although valid and final, does not bar another action by the plaintiff on the same 
claim . . . [w]hen the judgment is one of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or 
for nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties . . . .”). 
80. See infra Part I.E (discussing how state courts always have jurisdiction over such claims if 
the federal courts have been properly closed). 
81. See Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of 
the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129, 134–36 (1981) (discussing Congress’s use 
of jurisdictional regulation to prevent the supremacy, uniformity, and enforcement of federal 
law). 
82. See discussion infra Part I.E (arguing that several cases appear to have held court-stripping 
unconstitutional). 
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The different judgment required by, and thus the different effect of, 
the two forms of regulation is key.  Surely that different effect was an 
important, though unarticulated, part of Hart’s reasoning to reach the 
conclusion that puppeteering laws are clearly unconstitutional.83  Unlike 
court-stripping, in cases of puppeteering, the result would not be a 
dismissal for want of jurisdiction but rather a judgment on the merits.84  
That is the essence of such a law: its purported use of jurisdictional 
powers to require a judgment on the merits that would disregard other 
specified portions of the Constitution.  Puppeteering forces federal 
courts to do what Marbury said a federal court could not do: decide a 
case without considering the requirements of our most fundamental 
law.85  The federal courts would read the Constitution’s provisions for 
regulation of their jurisdiction to permit Congress to selectively switch 
off Marbury’s requirements. 
In Hart’s view, it is the availability of the state courts to give effect to 
constitutional rights—if the federal courts are stripped of authority to 
enforce them—that makes it at least arguable that court-stripping laws 
 
83. See Hart, supra note 4, at 1373. 
84. If the Supreme Court had taken the position that Congress could puppeteer—the position 
it rejected in Klein—that would have encompassed the view that federal courts could be forced to 
resolve disputes on the merits despite restrictions on their applying the Constitution in doing so.  
Since the Court is on record that its decisions must not be advisory, but must finally resolve real 
legal controversies, that position would entail that their decisions on the merits must be followed 
by state courts as well as by other federal courts.  See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 
52 (explaining the justifications for prohibiting judicial advisory opinions).  I believe that it was 
this unappealing aspect that makes puppeteering regulations especially constitutionally abhorrent. 
85. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803) (striking down portions of a 
statute read to assign the Supreme Court original jurisdiction but conflicting with limitations on 
Supreme Court jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution).  The Court stated: 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and 
interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the 
operation of each.  
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution 
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to 
the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding 
the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.  
This is of the very essence of judicial duty.  
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any 
ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern 
the case to which they both apply. 
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in 
court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must 
close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. 
Id. at 177–78.  Thus, the Court concluded that it is bound by legislative texts in hierarchical order 
and has the authority to invalidate acts of Congress that conflict with the constitution or another 
statute when it is necessary to do so in applying law to decide a case. 
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are within Congress’s constitutional powers.  In the previous Section, 
we saw that dual system court-stripping laws are arguably beyond 
Congress’s reach because Congress has no explicit or broad powers 
over those courts’ jurisdiction, and because Congress cannot repeal or 
alter the contents of the right in question.  Such rights are part of the 
laws of the United States that are also binding on state courts.86  If these 
arguments are correct, puppeteering regulations would accomplish the 
same result as dual system court-stripping by means of claim 
preclusion, which in its different way would deprive a plaintiff of a state 
forum free to vindicate his constitutional right.87 
After a federal court judgment, a state court must give it effect to 
prevent relitigation of  the same case.88  Remotely, a state court might 
consider that a judgment issued by an unconstitutionally hamstrung 
federal court is not entitled to preclusive effect.89  But a federal court, 
which rendered the judgment while complying with puppeteering 
restrictions, would already have determined—either explicitly or 
 
86. The Supremacy Clause makes federal law binding on state judges.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, 
cl. 2.  State courts are obligated to enforce federal law, unless Congress validly provides for 
exclusive federal court enforcement or they have a valid excuse, such as forum non conveniens, 
that is not based on hostility to the substance of federal policy.  See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 
394 (1947) (reversing a Rhode Island court’s refusal to entertain a federal statutory cause of 
action).  See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 408–17 (providing commentary on Testa 
and related cases). 
87. I very briefly present this argument in Young, U.S. v. Klein, supra note 4, at 109–10. 
88. For instance, in Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the Court applied a 
federal law of preclusion that deferred to a state preclusion law for state claims resolved in a 
federal diversity case.  In Semtek, the Court stated: 
[N]o federal textual provision addresses the claim-preclusive effect of a federal-court 
judgment in a federal-question case, yet we have long held that States cannot give 
those judgments merely whatever effect they would give their own judgments, but 
must accord them the effect that this Court prescribes. 
531 U.S. 497, 507 (2001) (citation omitted).  See also Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170–72 
(1938) (applying a federal court-made law of res judicata to a federal court’s judgments).  See 
generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 1311–14 (providing commentary on the res judicata 
effects of federal judgments); WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, 
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110(a), at 329–31 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and its relation to federal court judgments). 
89. Courts have occasionally recognized a fairness exception to the rule that they must give 
preclusive effect to the judgments of courts of other jurisdictions.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 71(2)(c) cmt. g (1982) (recognizing some ability to grant relief from a judgment if 
the issuing court deprived a litigant of a fair opportunity to present his claim or defense).  If an 
issue could not be fully and fairly litigated in the proceedings leading to the judgment, that may 
justify non-enforcement.  But if puppeteering laws were upheld and applied by the federal court 
issuing judgment, that court would have determined that it could issue a judgment on the merits.  
Thus, that would be preclusive of the issue of the effect of the federal court’s judgment in state 
court.  Cf. Parsons Steel Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525–26 (1986) (finding that a state 
court ruling on whether a federal court judgment was entitled to preclusive effect in the state 
proceedings was itself preclusive in a later federal court proceeding). 
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implicitly—that such a restriction is within Congress’s powers to 
regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  Thus, its decision would 
be meta res judicata on the very issue of whether its decision was res 
judicata, thus binding state courts.90 
Of course, it is extremely unlikely that a state court would even work 
through such analysis in the teeth of a federal court judgment.  This 
underscores how right-extinguishing a federal puppet court judgment is 
likely to be.  The claim will have been as effectively excluded from 
state court as it would have been if Congress had stripped it from the 
jurisdiction of both the state and federal courts.  Indeed, puppeteering is, 
if anything, slightly more troubling than dual system court-stripping.  
Repealing a court-stripping provision often will render enforceable a 
constitutional right previously blocked from all courts.91  Puppeteering, 
if valid, would extinguish the claim. 
Assuming that Congress has no power to court-strip both state and 
federal courts, it is precisely the near practical equivalence of 
puppeteering laws to such dual court-stripping that makes it unlikely a 
federal court would uphold such laws when challenged.  Indeed, this 
harsh consequence of puppeteering regulations seems to be the strongest 
single explanation of the result in Klein.92 
E. Cases of Uncertain Import: Battaglia, Three Supreme Court Cases, 
and Armstrong 
In Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.,93 the Second Circuit 
concluded, at a minimum,94 that a federal law which prohibits both state 
and federal trial courts from exercising jurisdiction over constitutionally 
 
90. A judgment concerning the preclusive proceedings is itself entitled to res judicata effect, 
even if erroneous, as long as it was issued in a way that would otherwise qualify it for preclusive 
effect.  Cf. Parsons Steel, 474 U.S. at 525–26 (finding that a state court ruling was preclusive in a 
later federal court proceeding). 
91. If a right cannot be enforced by any court (state or federal), it is unenforceable in an 
ordinary language sense.  If a court-stripping provision is repealed, then that barrier to 
enforcement is gone, and so the right becomes enforceable again unless it is subject to some 
defense, such as the expiration of a period of limitations.  And any previous dismissal of a 
plaintiff’s claim on jurisdictional grounds would not bar the claim on the merits, because they 
were not litigated.  See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
92. The constitutionally abhorrent consequences of puppeteering outlined earlier in this 
Article, coupled with my current views on methods of attributing meaning to earlier cases, lead 
me to this conclusion.  As for those views on interpreting cases, see infra Part II.A. 
93. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948), aff’d, 335 U.S. 887 (1948).  
94. There are even broader readings that would extend the area of unconstitutionality 
suggested by these cases to cover statutes that excluded congressionally unpopular constitutional 
rights from the lower federal courts alone, thus leaving the state courts open to enforce them.  See 
discussion infra Part I.E1. 
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based claims is unconstitutional.95  Likewise, on three occasions in the 
1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court, also at a minimum,96 found such 
laws sufficiently suspect to bend statutory interpretation.  In fact, in 
Armstrong v. United States,97 decided shortly after Klein, the Supreme 
Court may have actually struck down a simple federal court-stripping 
measure. 
In all of these cases, the federal court in question took jurisdiction 
over a constitutional claim that a federal statute seemed to exclude from 
federal trial court jurisdiction.98  In none of these cases, however, did 
the court discuss the unavailability of state courts as key to its 
conclusion regarding jurisdiction.99  Therefore, it is possible to read 
them as concerned about the constitutionality of a law that simply strips 
jurisdiction from the lower federal courts over specified constitutional 
claims.  Yet, there are reasons pointing away, while others point toward, 
 
95. See Portal to Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–62 (2006).  Section 252 states: 
(a) No employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act (in 
any action or proceeding commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947), on account 
of the failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an 
employee overtime compensation, for or on account of any activity of an employee 
engaged in prior to May 14, 1947, [except certain specified activities] 
. . . . 
(d) No court of the United States, of any State, Territory, or possession of the United 
States, or of the District of Columbia, shall have jurisdiction of any action or 
proceeding, whether instituted prior to or after May 14, 1947, to enforce liability or 
impose punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to pay minimum 
wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as 
amended, under the Walsh-Healey Act, or under the Bacon-Davis Act, to the extent 
that such action or proceeding seeks to enforce any liability or impose any punishment 
with respect to an activity which was not compensable under [those provisions of this 
section attempting to negate substantive liability]  
Id. at § 252 (emphasis added).  See also supra Part I.D.2 (spelling out powerful reasons 
supporting such a conclusion). 
96. Here, too, there is an alternative broader reading.  For a full discussion of the cases as well 
as the broader reading, see infra Part I.E.2. 
97. Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1871). 
98. See infra Parts I.E.1–3 (discussing, in detail, four Supreme Court cases—Webster v. Doe, 
486 U.S. 592 (1988); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986); 
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 
(1871)—and one Court of Appeals case—Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d 
Cir. 1948)—and the arguably jurisdiction-stripping statutes respectively involved in each).  
99. A word search of the opinions in those cases comes up with no reference to state or states 
that is in any way part of the Courts’, or any judge or Justice’s, analysis of how far court-stripping 
provisions can block or frustrate substantive constitutional rights enforcement.  In Battaglia, the 
word “state” appears once in a discussion of a different issue (the constitutionality of a direct 
repeal of certain entitlements) and then in the footnotes (but only in a quotation of the statute that 
explicitly disallows state courts jurisdiction over the claims in question).  Nowhere in their 
deliberations do the judges discuss that aspect of the statute’s jurisdictional limitations.  For 
occurrences of the word “state” in Battaglia, see Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 256 n.3, 261. 
ARTICLES_5_YOUNG.DOCX 11/9/2012  12:30 PM 
288 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
this alternative reading.  Let us explore the ambiguity of these cases. 
1. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp. 
In Battaglia, a distinguished panel100 of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit determined that it would be unconstitutional for 
Congress to use its jurisdictional powers to block judicial consideration 
of the plaintiff’s claim that the federal government had caused a 
deprivation of a vested, constitutionally protected property right.101 
Earlier, the Supreme Court had interpreted the Fair Labor Standards 
Act in a way that was surprising to many, including Hart.102  The 
interpretation entitled mining employees to compensation for time spent 
traveling from the surface of the mine to the work site underground and 
back again at the end of the day, so-called “portal-to-portal time.”  This 
decision resulted in liabilities, both to private employers and to the 
government, by virtue of cost-plus contracts, which were a significant 
percentage of the nation’s gross domestic product.103  In response, 
Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act in an attempt to retroactively 
destroy such newly recognized liabilities.  Hedging its bet on the 
constitutionality of such a retroactive, substantive repeal, the statute 
provided a back-up means to accomplish its questionable ends.  It 
purported to deprive both state and federal courts of jurisdiction to 
enforce any claim for portal-to-portal compensation that the statute 
 
100. See generally MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND’S COURT (1970) (providing a history of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit during Learned Hand’s tenure as Chief 
Judge from 1939 to 1951).  As for the Second Circuit as a whole during this period, Schick 
concludes: “Greatness may consist of doing greatly what a court is capable of doing.  In this 
sense, the Learned Hand Court was truly outstanding.”  Id. at 355.  Battaglia was decided during 
this era and its opinion was written by Harrie Chase.  Id. at 255.  Concurring in opinion were 
Learned Hand’s cousin, Augustus Hand, and Thomas Swan.  Id.  For laudatory evaluations of 
these three judges, see id. at 26–29, 23–26, and 19–23, respectively. 
101. See Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 257 (holding that the Fifth Amendment limits Congress’s 
power to remove jurisdiction over property claims if the rights have vested). 
102. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 691 (1946), superseded by statute, 
Portal to Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–62 (2006), as recognized in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 
546 U.S. 21 (2005) (“[T]he time necessarily spent by the employees in walking to work on the 
employer’s premises, following the punching of the time clocks, was working time within the 
scope of [the statute].”).  The amount of compensation under this interpretation was immense.  
For Henry Hart’s description of the surprise that the Anderson decision engendered, see Hart, 
supra note 4, at 1383–84. 
103. The excess liability of employers resulting from the Court’s Portal to Portal interpretation 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act totaled five billion dollars, of which $1.4 billion was potentially 
owed by the Federal Department of War on cost-plus contracts.  FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 
306–07.  These amounts were respectively two per cent (.02048) and half a percent (.0057) of the 
United States’ gross domestic product in 1947, which was $244.1 billion (in 1947 dollars).  See 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, 
http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp (last modified Aug. 15, 2012).  
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could not repeal consistently with the Constitution.104 
The Battaglia court began its analysis with a consideration of the 
constitutionality of such a deprivation of jurisdiction over a 
constitutional claim.  The court concluded that, if a jurisdictional 
limitation such as the one before it blocked its enforcement of a 
constitutional right, then the limit was unconstitutional.105 
As required by its test for the validity of jurisdictional restrictions, the 
court then looked to the underlying merits and found that the 
substantive constitutional claim to compensation was without merit and 
so upheld the jurisdictional limitation.106  This statement in Battaglia is 
the clearest statement, in all reported opinions to date, of the 
unconstitutionality of certain federal court jurisdiction restrictions, 
outside the realm of habeas corpus, an area otherwise governed by an 
explicit guarantee of court access rather than an inferential one 
stemming from Article III.107   
Nevertheless, questions about Battaglia remain, based on ambiguities 
and other features of the case.  Firstly, was the court’s statement holding 
or was it just extraordinarily clear dicta?  Secondly, whether dicta or 
holding, what did the critical statement condemn?  Did Battaglia 
condemn court-stripping of lower federal courts’ trial jurisdiction or 
was it concerned with something more devastating to constitutional 
rights and functionally equivalent to puppeteering regulations—dual 
state and federal trial court-stripping? 
On the one hand, the fact that the Battaglia court did not strike down 
the jurisdictional limitation as applied to the case before it may appear 
to support the “dicta view.”  Consequently, it is uncertain whether the 
court would have “put its money where its mouth was” and struck down 
the provision had it turned out to block a constitutionally protected, 
vested right.  In fact, the court merely condemned the jurisdictional 
restriction as it would apply in crucially different circumstances—those 
in which it actually blocked enforcement of constitutional rights. 
 
104. Portal to Portal Act § 252(d). 
105. The Battaglia court stated: 
[W]hile Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the 
jurisdiction of courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power 
as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to 
take private property without just compensation.  Thus, regardless of whether [the 
jurisdiction-stripping] had an independent end in itself, if one of its effects would be to 
deprive the appellants of property without due process or just compensation, it would 
be invalid.  
169 F.2d at 257 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted). 
106. Id. at 257–62. 
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  For the full text, see supra note 46. 
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On the other hand, the court acted on its stated constitutional test for 
the validity of jurisdictional restrictions.  It did so by following its just-
announced decision protocol—that a determination of the validity of 
such a jurisdictional restriction depended on whether it blocked 
enforcement of a constitutional right.  Accordingly, the court moved to 
a consideration of whether the jurisdictional restriction would have such 
an effect in the case.  In deciding that the right had not vested,108 the 
Second Circuit found the jurisdictional restriction constitutionally 
acceptable.109  Thus, its statement was instrumental in the resolution of 
the case.  As a result, Battaglia’s statements seem to lie in the shadowy 
“no man’s land” between dicta and holding.  Regardless of how one 
may characterize the statements in Battaglia, they are the carefully 
considered expressions of a particularly powerful panel: Judges Chase, 
Swan, and Augustus Hand.110 
Notwithstanding its indeterminate precedential status, Battaglia made 
clear its view that, as applied to prevent enforcement of constitutional 
rights, the jurisdiction-stripping provision under consideration would 
have been unconstitutional.  Was the Second Circuit’s concern solely 
with that fact of attempted dual system court-stripping, which has much 
the same effect as puppeteering: the functional extinguishment of the 
claim as one enforceable in any court?  Or was it simply that federal 
trial courts had been closed to such claims?  Express language in the 
statute purported to close both the federal and state courts to claims of 
compensation, whose constitutionally protected status was asserted but 
undetermined at the outset of the case.   
The first is more constitutionally troubling (as outlined in previous 
Sections).111  The second is also debatably unconstitutional, even 
though it leaves state courts open to enforce any constitutional right.  
Indeed, Laurence Tribe sees the second type of regulation as 
unconstitutional;112 Henry Hart seems to lean the other way.113 
Which of these scholar’s views is Battaglia best seen as supporting?  
Battaglia seems to stand for the second view that is more restrictive of 
Congress, one that even prohibits the closing of lower federal courts 
without respect to the availability of the state courts.  In its analysis 
 
108. Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 261–62. 
109. Id. at 257–62 (reaching the conclusion that the limit on the federal trial court jurisdiction 
over certain claims was valid only because the rights asserted were not vested constitutional 
rights, but were subject to repeal by statute). 
110. See generally SCHICK, supra note 100, at 5–38. 
111. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
112. Tribe, supra note 81, at 132, 136, 155. 
113. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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condemning the jurisdictional restriction as applied to a constitutional 
claim with merit, the court never referred to the fact that the statute 
purported to close state courts to portal-to-portal claims. The only 
mention of the closing of state courts is in a quotation from the statute 
in a general description of its operation.114  Nowhere in the Battaglia 
opinion does the Second Circuit suggest that the portion dealing with 
state courts played a role in the court’s analysis. Thus, the opinion 
largely reads as if the court’s only concern was with the 
constitutionality of a restriction on its jurisdiction. 
Yet, Battaglia’s view is more obviously right if read narrowly and 
restricted to statutes that have the most destructive effect on federal 
constitutional rights—i.e., those that render them unenforceable in any 
court.  And courts use a fairly free hand in interpreting earlier, peer-
level opinions for purposes of stare decisis.  Supporting this 
interpretation, one might simply see, in the court’s expressed concern 
about compensation for takings, that Battaglia concerns the availability 
of some remedy in some set of courts.115 
It is not at all surprising to see Battaglia cited only for the narrower 
proposition—the unconstitutionality of closing all courts.116  Yet, 
Battaglia also lends support for the unconstitutionality of simple federal 
court-stripping, and thus, continues to offer potential support for both 
views until the Second Circuit definitively elucidates Battaglia’s 
meaning or the Supreme Court clarifies the law.  Only the Supreme 
Court can finally resolve whether the constitutional ban on puppeteering 
and its nearly identical twin, dual system court-stripping, should be 
extended to include their less troubling cousin, simple lower federal 
court-stripping.  A number of more recent Supreme Court cases also 
bear on this issue but also are ambiguous in ways similar to Battaglia.  
These cases, as equivocal as Battaglia but much more complex, are 
addressed in the next several Sections. 
 
114. Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 256, 261 n.13. 
115. Battaglia is also susceptible to a third and even narrower reading that the Takings Clause 
is special and that, under such circumstances, closing both sets of courts constitutes a taking 
under one of the few constitutional provisions that specifically provides a remedy for its 
violation: just compensation.  Habeas might be seen as similar in providing an express remedy for 
constitutional wrongs, though not those defined by the habeas provision itself, but by the 
entitlements to liberty in the Due Process Clauses.  But this is not a clearly necessary reading of 
Battaglia.  If Battaglia does not prohibit single system court-stripping but only closing of both 
federal and state courts, a better reading is that such dual system stripping provisions are 
unconstitutional to the extent that they prohibit all enforcement of a constitutional right otherwise 
enforceable. 
116. FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 305. 
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2. Supreme Court Cases: A Ninety-Degree Turn in the 1970s and 1980s 
In Battaglia, Congress’s attempt to close both federal and state trial 
courts to specified claims of Constitutional violations was clear on the 
face of the statute considered by the court, though not discussed in the 
opinion.  However, it is unclear whether the simultaneous closing of the 
state courts was essential to the Second Circuit’s reasoning that the 
statute would have been unconstitutional had the claim asserted in the 
district court been one to protect an actual constitutional right. 
The Supreme Court cases from the 1970s and 1980s discussed below 
resemble Battaglia in some ways.117  Each case casts doubt on the 
constitutionality of a statute, which on its surface closed only the federal 
courts to specified constitutional claims.  They are unlike Battaglia in 
that they do not make clear whether state courts were unavailable as 
backstops. 
After over a century of making statements that Congress can remove 
any set of cases from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts,118 the 
Supreme Court decided a series of three opinions in the 1970s and 
1980s that can be read as rethinking this nearly absolute control.  In 
Johnson v. Robison,119 Webster v. Doe,120 and Bowen v. Michigan 
Academy of Family Physicians,121 the Supreme Court confronted: (1) 
claims for coercive relief against federal administrative officials to 
protect certain constitutional rights, and (2) statutory provisions that 
could be fairly read to deny jurisdiction over the cases.  In all three 
cases, the Court read the latter provisions as not precluding jurisdiction 
on the ground that such an interpretation would raise a serious 
constitutional question about Congress’s powers to enact court-stripping 
legislation.122 
As with Battaglia, discussed above, and Armstrong, discussed below, 
 
117. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (holding that while section 102(c) of the 
National Security Act gives the CIA director very broad discretion to terminate employees, it 
does not “exclude review of constitutional claims” and acknowledging that if construed 
otherwise, it would raise serious constitutional questions); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family 
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986) (construing neither 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff nor § 1395ii to 
bar judicial review of Medicare program regulations, acknowledging that to find otherwise would 
raise a serious constitutional question, and citing to commentators on the court-stripping debate); 
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366–67 (1974) (reading 38 U.S.C. § 211(a), which generally 
precludes judicial review of the decisions of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, not to reach 
the equal protection claims of the plaintiff below). 
118. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
119. Johnson, 415 U.S. at 366–67. 
120. Webster, 486 U.S. at 603. 
121. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 681 n.12. 
122. See supra note 117 and accompanying parentheticals (listing the Court’s conclusions that 
Congress was not precluded from using its power to enact court-stripping legislation). 
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what is not clear in the more recent Supreme Court cases is the nature of 
the constitutional question.  Similar to Battaglia, the majority opinion—
in fact, all opinions—in all three cases never discussed state courts, 
much less the possibility that state courts were implicitly excluded from 
enforcement powers.123  There was no suggestion in any of the three 
opinions that what made the exclusion of federal jurisdiction 
constitutionally problematic was the simultaneous exclusion of state 
court jurisdiction.  Indeed, unlike the statute considered in Battaglia, 
none of the statutes considered in the three Supreme Court cases 
mentioned state courts at all. 
Thus, on the surface, each of the three opinions concern court-
stripping in the form where constitutional objections are at their weakest 
(though still debatable)—Congress’s doing no more than singling out 
particular constitutional claims for exclusion from federal trial court 
enforcement.124  If this reading is accurate, then the Court turned ninety 
degrees from long-standing dicta that federal court-stripping is 
generally constitutional, to one in which it is recognized as a troubling 
question to be avoided in almost all circumstances.  It is important to 
note, however, that the Court in these three cases did not spin one 
hundred eighty degrees to a position in dicta that such exclusion would 
be unconstitutional. 
In a previous article on court-stripping, I placed these cases in the 
federal court-stripping cubbyhole.125 From that perspective, their 
constitutional skepticism about court-stripping extended even to a 
situation in which state courts remain open.  Under such a view, they 
open reconsideration of decades of dicta supporting mere single system 
federal court-stripping.  The editors of Hart and Wechsler’s The 
Federal Courts and the Federal System (“Hart and Wechsler”) seem, 
implicitly, to make the opposite choice: by placing these cases in a 
section on dual system-stripping, they suggest a more limited set of 
Supreme Court concerns.126 
 
123. A careful reading and word search of the opinions revealed no such analysis. 
124. For the proposition that ordinary court-stripping of federal courts presents real, but lesser 
constitutional concerns than puppeteering or dual system federal and state court-stripping, see 
supra Part I.D.  For the fact that the analytic portion of the Battaglia and the three Supreme Court 
opinions never discussed the simultaneous closing of the state courts as significant, see supra 
notes 100–22 and accompanying text.  Thus, the opinions in these cases were written as if the 
only issue was the mere closing down of federal courts and that such closing was constitutionally 
problematic by itself. 
125. Young, Congress’s Power to Restrict, supra note 43, at 150–54. 
126. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 305–09 (declining to mention these cases in the 
portions devoted to mere elimination of federal trial court jurisdiction and including them only in 
a section dealing with “congressional preclusion of both state and federal court jurisdiction”). 
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Just like Battaglia, these decisions are ambiguous because it is 
possible that the state courts were closed as well to the plaintiffs’ 
claims.127  If that were true, then the effect of the statutes in these three 
cases is the same as that of the dual system court-stripping powerfully 
condemned by Hart128 and by the Second Circuit in Battaglia, even on a 
narrow reading of that opinion.129  My own view is that Hart and 
Battaglia were right—Congress cannot remove jurisdiction from both 
state and federal courts to hear a set of constitutional claims.  Thus, on a 
proper reading of the Constitution, if federal courts were closed to the 
claims in these three cases, then state courts were open to consider their 
merits.  The language of Article III, the Supremacy Clause, and the 
Madisonian Compromise together seem to indicate that Congress has no 
jurisdictional regulatory powers to close both the state and federal 
courts to enforcement of constitutional claims otherwise appropriate for 
enforcement.130 
But everyone might not agree.  There are at least respectable 
counterarguments that, without explicit statutory consent, state courts 
are foreclosed, by structural features of federalism, from hearing suits to 
compel federal officers to adhere to law in performing their duties.131  
The case law basis for such an argument is at least plausible, though not 
clearly correct, when the suit is a habeas corpus proceeding to free a 
detainee held by a federal officer.132  By analogy, and with the support 
 
127. See infra note 132 and accompanying text (recognizing the existence of arguments 
founded in case law that would, on grounds of implicit limits in constitutional federalism, prohibit 
state courts from issuing coercive relief against federal officers). 
128. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
129. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
130. There are, however, many reasons other than jurisdiction-stripping that constitutional 
rights might not be enforceable in state courts.  Sovereign immunity, for example, provides 
Congress with the ability to block, in all courts, claims for damages sought against the United 
States Treasury.  For elaboration on the proposition that there is a general requirement that courts 
keep government within bounds and remedy constitutional rights—but balanced against other 
interests that sometimes regrettably, but legitimately, get in the way—see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. 
& Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 1731, 1738–57 (1991). 
131. See infra notes 132–34 (describing cases suggesting that state courts may not exercise 
habeas corpus jurisdiction over federal prisoners or issue mandamus to federal officers, although 
these cases also might be read in a more limited way).  Likewise, state courts have never issued 
injunctions to federal officers, and scholars speculate as to whether that is ever constitutionally 
permissible.  See supra note 112.  Together, all of this information suggests the possibility that 
state courts have no power to control federal officers.  This possibility, however, leads to the 
unattractive conclusion that state courts would have had little ability to serve as protectors of 
constitutional rights had there been no lower federal courts or when their jurisdiction is 
selectively shut off for constitutional claims. This conclusion is unattractive to me.  I reject it.  So 
did Henry Hart.  See Hart, supra note 4, at 1401; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
132. Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S (13 Wall.) 397, 409 (1872) (reversing a state court judgment on 
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of suggestions in the cases, one might see the structural bar as also 
extending to mandamus and injunctive relief against federal officers.133  
I reject this position; but, if one accepts it, then the three cases from the 
1970s and 1980s arguably are more concerned with the constitutionality 
of laws resembling dual system court-stripping, and might be so 
confined. 
It seems plausible that the Court in the 1970s and 1980s cases had a 
sense, perhaps not fully developed, that removal of federal court 
jurisdiction to enforce constitutional rights would ultimately raise issues 
not just of federal court-stripping but of how to handle a provision that 
might leave no court open.134  Most pointedly, which set of trial courts 
might the Supreme Court require to be open if it were to strike down 
such a provision?  Perhaps it is this set of constitutional difficulties, not 
simply those of single system federal court-stripping, that caused the 
Court to duck and reinterpret the statutes in question.  Thus, these cases 
may be seen as avoiding the issue as to whether state courts must be 
available as backstops, making it unlikely to be resolved unless 
Congress were to force the issue by very clear statutory language.135  
While the meaning of these cases remains open to interpretation, they 
are best read as being concerned with the especially pernicious 
constitutional problem—dual system court-stripping.136 
 
the ground that state courts are unavailable to hear habeas corpus claims of those detained by 
federal officials, but doing so in the context of a case over which federal courts possessed habeas 
jurisdiction).  But there are other readings of Tarble’s Case’s prohibition on state court habeas 
directed to federal officials as confined to circumstances in which the federal courts are also 
closed.  See FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 398–406. 
133. See McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 605 (1821) (holding that a state court 
did not possess the power to issue a writ of mandamus directed to a federal official).  For the 
ambiguities in this line of cases, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 406–07.  As for failure to 
resolve whether there may be a rule against state court injunctions directed to federal officials 
resembling the stringent view of state court habeas corpus, see id. at 407.  
134. Unlike the Court in Klein and Armstrong in the 1870s, Johnson, Webster and Bowen—
the Supreme Court decisions from the 1970s and 1980s previously discussed—were decided after 
Hart’s well-known dialogue; thus, the dialogue was available to and presumably known by many 
of the participating justices.  
 135. I believe that to effectively close the lower federal courts, such a statute would have to 
make clear: (1) that it intended to close both the state courts and the lower federal courts, but (2) 
that, if such dual closure was found unconstitutional, it was the state courts that were to remain 
open.  Without part (2), I believe that federal courts would simply make the reasonable 
assumption that Congress’s preference was the reverse.  Such a provision is unlikely but not 
impossible.  A Congress that disfavored a particular court-declared constitutional right against 
certain action by states might prefer to let state rather than federal courts deal with the assertion of 
such rights by plaintiffs.  
136. We have seen that that form is at least the fraternal twin of the sort of puppeteering 
regulation that the Court struck in Klein.  See supra Part I.D.  
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3. United States v. Armstrong: A Partial Reconsideration 
One interesting Supreme Court case arguably is similar to the three 
considered above.  Armstrong v. United States137 is a case not 
mentioned by Henry Hart and neglected by federal court scholars until 
the 1980s.138  Armstrong brought his action in the Court of Claims 
before the 1870 Acts went into effect.139  The Court of Claims 
dismissed Armstrong’s case on grounds of his disloyalty in fact.140  In 
addition to its puppeteering provision, which was struck in Klein, the 
law included a court-stripping provision.141  It excluded from the Court 
of Claims all claims to property seized by Union Troops on grounds of 
innocence that were based on Lincoln’s pardon.  Citing Klein, the 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, requiring the Court of Claims to 
consider Armstrong’s claim on the merits, despite the court-stripping 
provision.142  The citation to Klein was the Court’s only explanation.143 
Thus, Armstrong invalidated a provision, which on the surface of its 
language simply excluded a set of constitutionally based claims from 
 
137. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1871). 
138. Young, Klein Revisited, supra note 1, at 1222 n.179. 
139. See Armstrong v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 623, 625–26 (1869), rev’d, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
154 (1871) (dismissing the suit on the ground of Armstrong’s actual disloyalty). 
140. When the Court of Claims dismissed Armstrong’s case, the 1870 Act was not in force 
and hence was not the ground for that court’s dismissal.  See id. at 625–26.  When the Supreme 
Court heard Armstrong’s appeal, the 1870 Act was in force.  Armstrong, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 
155–56.  At the time the Supreme Court decided Armstrong, there was (and still is) a requirement 
that federal courts apply new and otherwise constitutional statutes to cases pending before it.  See 
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109–10 (1801); see also FALLON ET AL., 
supra note 3, at 88 (recognizing that since Schooner Peggy, “courts are obligated to apply law 
(otherwise valid) as they find it at the time of their decision, including, when a case is on review, 
new statutes enacted after the judgment below”); Young, Klein Revisited, supra note 1, at 1240 & 
nn.238–41.  Thus, if Congress could have properly excluded pardonees’ claims from the Court of 
Claims, the Supreme Court would have affirmed the Court of Claims dismissal on the 
independent and intervening ground of the 1870 Act.  Instead, the Court remanded, ignoring the 
jurisdictional restriction as unconstitutional.  Armstrong, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 155–56.  
141. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235 (“[A]nd on proof of such pardon . . . the 
jurisdiction of the court in the case shall cease, and the court shall forthwith dismiss the suit of 
such claimant.”). 
142. Armstrong, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 154–56. 
143. The Court’s full statement is brief:  
We have recently held, in the case of the United States v. Klein, that pardon granted 
upon conditions, blots out the offence, if proof is made of compliance with the 
conditions; and that the person so pardoned is entitled to the restoration of the proceeds 
of captured and abandoned property, if suit be brought within “two years after the 
suppression of the rebellion.”  The proclamation of the 25th of December granted 
pardon unconditionally and without reservation.  This was a public act of which all 
courts of the United States are bound to take notice, and to which all courts are bound 
to give effect.  The claim of the petitioner was preferred within two years.  The Court 
of Claims, therefore, erred in not giving the petitioner the benefit of the proclamation. 
Id. at 155–56. 
ARTICLES_5_YOUNG.DOCX 11/9/2012  12:30 PM 
2012] United States v. Klein, Then and Now 297 
the federal courts. 
I cited Armstrong in my original article on Klein.  In a subsequent 
article, I argued that, while strange and anomalous in light of 
preexisting dicta to the contrary, Armstrong is the only Supreme Court 
case holding a court-stripping provision unconstitutional.144  In 
response, editors of Hart and Wechsler suggested that what Armstrong 
condemned, whatever its form, was more akin to a puppeteering 
provision than a simple provision stripping federal court trial 
jurisdiction: 
By contrast, Young argues, Armstrong . . . involved a “court-
stripping” portion of the statute purporting to deprive trial courts of 
jurisdiction over a defined class of cases.  He concludes that “[i]t 
seems impossible to distinguish . . . the plaintiff in Armstrong from 
plaintiffs today who might seek federal court enforcement of modern 
constitutional rights, such as busing or abortion rights, despite a 
statute which purports to close off the federal courts.” . . . Under a 
statute that authorizes lower courts to entertain claims, but orders them 
to dismiss those claims for want of jurisdiction upon proof of a 
presidential pardon, is the line between “puppeteering” and “court-
stripping” as clear as Young suggests?145 
The editors do not elaborate why, despite its court-stripping form, the 
substance of the provision struck in Armstrong resembled puppeteering.  
There seems to be one possible good reason why the provision in 
Armstrong is closer to a puppeteering regulation than to mere federal 
court-stripping, which it resembled in form.  There are powerful 
arguments that the state courts were closed to such claims.146  If so, 
then the court-stripping provision in Armstrong substantially had the 
effect of dual system state and federal trial court-stripping, which 
offends Article III as understood in the context of the Madisonian 
Compromise.147  And it is entirely possible that the state courts were 
closed to Armstrong’s claim.  Indeed, given the sovereign immunity of 
the federal government, the burden is on the proponent to present 
arguments that the state courts might have remotely been open.148 
 
144. Young, Congress’s Power to Restrict, supra note 43, at 164. 
145. FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 304 n.27. 
146. Although the details have been worked out over a great many years, from the beginning 
under the Constitution, suits against the United States or seeking its property, to which the 
government did not consent by statute, were problematic and, at the very least, likely to be barred 
by sovereign immunity.  See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478 (1793) (assuming in 
dicta that such suits are barred).  See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 841–43. 
147. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 130, at 1797–807 (discussing the language of Article 
III). 
148. See supra note 146 (explaining the issues that arise with suits against the United States as 
a party or suits seeking property).  
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Certainly, to the Supreme Court of the 1870s it would have been 
unthinkable that the state courts would ever hear claims, such as 
Armstrong’s for money damages against the United States, without 
consent in a federal statute.149  But it was equally unthinkable that 
federal courts could do so.  It had long been clear that the United States 
was not subject to suit by individuals seeking money damages.  This 
indeed is the backdrop to one of the mysteries of Armstrong and Klein.  
In Armstrong, the United States in the 1870 Act had revoked any 
consent it had given to a class of suits for money damages.150  As 
applied in Klein, that statute had retroactively revoked consent to suit 
for cases on appeal.  On the surface, either invocation of sovereign 
immunity should have been within Congress’s constitutional powers, 
and thus, would seem to require a different result in both cases. 
Perhaps there is a better explanation of Klein and Armstrong by 
analogy to equal protection.  Today, Congress can deny consent to 
almost any category of suit seeking money damages from the federal 
treasury, but a denial based on race, gender, or some other suspect class 
would surely be unconstitutional.151   Perhaps both Klein and 
Armstrong reflected a similar, if not hazy, view of presidential pardons, 
specifically that federal law must treat those receiving pardons the same 
way it treats those who were actually innocent of the conduct in 
question.  If so, then both cases can be seen as holding that, unless 
Congress clearly wanted to more generally deny relief to all whose 
property had been seized, it could not deny relief to those who met the 
statutory requirements by virtue of a pardon. 
This interpretation, however, does not help resolve the issues that the 
Hart and Wechsler editors raised concerning Armstrong.  The question 
remains whether such a pardon equality right would have been 
enforceable in any state courts that were opened by statute to certain 
claims against the federal government had Congress never established 
lower federal courts. 
One view is that, at least absent federal statutory consent, there are 
some things a state court simply can never do while respecting federal 
interests, even if this restriction would mean that a federal constitutional 
right is nowhere enforceable.152  As discussed above, issuing coercive 
 
149. See United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 288 (1846).  For a general 
discussion of which suits are treated as suits against the United States—and barred without 
statutory consent—and which are treated as suits against officers and permitted, see FALLON ET 
AL., supra note 3, at 841–59.  
150. See Young, Klein Revisited, supra note 1, at 1222 n.179. 
151. FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 292. 
152. See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text (discussing Tarble’s Case, which held 
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judgments to federal officials may be one of these restrictions.153  But 
that would also entail that state courts were not a complete jurisdictional 
backstop to enforce federal constitutional rights had Congress not 
created lower federal courts.  This interpretation seems inconsistent 
with Marbury, the Supremacy Clause, and the Madisonian 
Compromise, which all permit Congress to use state courts in place of 
federal courts.  A different, albeit more imaginative, reading of 
Armstrong (and this sort of “reconstruction” must depend heavily on 
imagination) is that it would never have occurred to the Armstrong 
Court that if some court must be open, Congress would have preferred it 
be a state court.  Thus, a better reading of Armstrong may be that 
Congress could not close both court systems to a pardon equality claim 
and that, had Congress known this limitation, it would have preferred an 
expert federal court that it had designated generally for such matters 
over a state court.154 
II. KLEIN NOW: A RECONSIDERATION 
In the years since I first wrote about Klein, my views on how to 
attribute meaning to old cases have changed in favor of more expansive 
readings.  As a result, it now seems reasonable to read Klein as placing 
some limits on congressional regulation of courts’ fact-finding 
processes.155   Even though Klein was not affected by such a limit, its 
broader concerns about interference with courts’ processes easily 
generalize to cover unreasonable restrictions on methods of fact-finding. 
Additionally, it now seems a better reading that, at a reasonable level 
of generality, Klein also restricts tampering with federal courts’ 
methods of statutory and Constitutional interpretation.  Though there is 
much more room for Congress to regulate how courts read federal 
statutes, some Article III limits on interference with statutory 
interpretation should be recognized.  These limits are easily seen as 
within Klein’s concerns about interference with federal courts’ decision 
processes.156  As discussed in recent writings about Klein by Howard 
 
that state courts are unavailable to hear habeas corpus claims of those detained by federal 
officials, and McClung v. Silliman, which held that a state court did not possess the power to use 
a writ of mandamus directed to a federal court). 
153. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
154. This parallels how I now see the Supreme Court’s ambiguous cases in the 1970s and 
1980s.  See supra notes 116–38 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdiction- and court-
stripping). 
155. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing how Klein might limit congressional regulation of 
judicial fact-finding). 
156. See infra Part II.B.2.  
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Wasserman157 and Steven Vladeck,158 these thoughts implicate some 
provisions of the superstructure of the War on Terror that would dictate 
whether courts can consider foreign and international law in interpreting 
some federal statutes. 
Finally, those issues inspire consideration of whether Klein might 
have a legitimate bearing on the constitutionality of federal habeas 
corpus statutes.159  Those provisions place limits on the availability and 
operation of post-conviction relief for state prisoners who allege federal 
constitutional mistakes by the state courts in the process of deciding and 
reviewing criminal cases.160  The provisions in question require federal 
trial judges, in determining the validity of the incarceration of convicted 
state prisoners, to defer to the interpretations of federal constitutional 
law made by state judges.  In other words, Klein, properly read, might 
call into question the correctness of Williams v. Taylor, which upheld 
such provisions after reading them unnecessarily broadly.161  Below, I 
quickly examine this case in various ways, including through 
considerations previously developed in this Article.162  Next, in its final 
Section, this Article examines scholarship that pushes Klein’s holding 
too far.163 
A. Some Slightly Revisionary Thoughts on Klein and on Reading Old 
Cases 
How should one attribute meaning to opinions in old cases?  This 
problem becomes especially acute if the old precedents: (1) deal with 
aspects of the world very different from those existing at the time of the 
later case, or (2) are offered in support for theories developed at a later 
time.164  While of course there are simply things that an earlier opinion 
 
157. Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, supra note 2, at 232–33. 
158. Vladeck, supra note 5, at 261. 
159. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing Congress’s control over courts’ interpretations of 
statutes in cases where constitutional rights are not implicated). 
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2) (2006) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on 
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with 
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”). 
161. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378–79 (2000).  For a list of requirements that 
must be met before a writ of habeas corpus may be granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). 
162. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing, in light of Williams v. Taylor, the effects of lower 
federal court decisions and the constitutional reasoning of federal courts in deciding a 
constitutional case).  
163. See infra Part II.C (discussing the Redish and Pudelski scholarship on Klein).  
164. A different article would meditate at length on the differences and similarities of these 
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cannot be made to say, courts often avoid the decision of whether to 
overrule by reading precedents elastically.  If one accepts this view, 
then the soundness of finding a case’s dicta or holding is often a matter 
of some satisfying fit with surrounding law and theories and much less 
the finding of the exact original meaning of an opinion. 
Put differently, Ronald Dworkin’s view of how courts and judges 
function at their best165 is much more often realized in the practice of 
reading cases than in the practice of reading statutes, where the 
tendency to pursue a fictitious embedded meaning often conceals the 
necessary lawmaking involved.  This is particularly true for judges 
wedded to textualism.166 
From a more flexible perspective, it should be unnecessary that a 
holding from a much earlier case actually occurred to the authors of the 
older opinion undergoing interpretation.167  It is necessary, however, 
that: (1) however general an attributed holding is, it—if it had been 
applied—would have resolved the case as it was resolved, (2) the 
opinion’s authors would have understood the attributed holding, and (3) 
the opinion’s authors would likely have found its holding forceful or 
attractive.168  The strength of an attributed holding initially depends on 
 
questions as they arise in the case of statutory or constitutional interpretation.  In statutory 
interpretation, the dominant conceit, and often fiction, is one of a court’s finding preexisting 
meaning—the meaning packed into the statute at its birth.  And the tools for doing so are 
dictionaries, textual canons of statutory interpretation, etc.  These are like the tools delivered at a 
table with a lobster to extract the meat that is embedded in the claw.  Nothing is literally 
embedded in statutory language, but if embedding is a metaphor for sufficient clarity in a 
community of speakers’ practices for producing language to be decoded, then there is 
metaphorical embedding.  I am skeptical about how much clarity (embedded meaning) exists in 
statutes and thus also about the ratio of decoding to creativity in statutory interpretation. 
 Although the surface conceit seems to be the same when the object of judicial interpretation is a 
previous judicial opinion, one sees much less of anything resembling an effort at finding a 
preexisting intention or meaning.  The use of dictionaries and linguistic canons almost never, if 
ever, play any role in a court’s assigning meaning to previous cases for the purpose of 
determining whether they are bound in any of the ways that precedents bind lower courts and, 
more weakly, bind the issuing court in future cases. 
165. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 20.  By a Dworkinian reading of cases, I mean a 
reading through the processes of “law as integrity” as advocated in Law’s Empire.  Id. at 225–32, 
240–45.  As with the author of the next chapter in a chain novel, a judge both must honor the 
constraints of the values and decisions made in the past but, within those limits, has great room to 
interpret them and strive to make his contribution show the past in its best current light. 
166. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 
(1990) (describing forms of textualism, appreciating some of their virtues, and offering a critique 
of their vices); Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 
431 (1989) (recognizing the substantial element of lawmaking in statutory interpretation). 
167. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing the multiple factors that affect 
statutory interpretation). 
168. Hart’s puppeteering reading of Klein passes this test, as does an extension of it above to a 
protection of Article III courts’ fact-finding and interpretive processes.  See discussion infra Part 
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these factors; but if they are indeterminate, then a fourth factor should 
break the tie.  Following Dworkin, it seems accurate that in close cases 
under the first three criteria, proper attribution of a holding depends on 
its attractiveness as a rule of law in the current legal system.169 
These ideas lead to a slight change of my views on Klein, views very 
different from the conditional, but stronger, retraction involving 
Armstrong.170  A holding against puppeteering still seems best 
attributable to Klein, but that does not clearly indicate that the Klein 
Court had such a holding in mind.  Hart’s much later writings, 
distinguishing between court-stripping and puppeteering,171 were not 
available to the justices who decided Klein. 
What makes the anti-puppeteering reading of Klein powerful is: (1) 
the long history of dicta that supported the constitutionality of mere 
federal court-stripping at the time Klein was decided, and (2) what must 
have been the Klein Court’s sense that the regulation of courts it 
confronted was somehow different and more troubling than court-
stripping or any form of regulation previously confronted or discussed.  
The latter is true even if the justices had not precisely pinned down how 
or why the interference was different, either in their opinion or in their 
minds.  The problem is one of fitting a new explicit theory (Hart’s) to an 
old case decided before the theory became available.  What makes 
Hart’s anti-puppeteering theory the best fit is that it so powerfully 
explains the Klein Court’s unease.  It seems very likely that, had Hart’s 
argument against puppeteering been presented to Chief Justice Salmon 
Chase in Klein, it would have been featured in his opinion to explain 
what made Klein so different from the ordinary single system court-
stripping that the Court had repeatedly said was within Congress’s 
powers. 
The next Section looks at how Klein can comfortably be broadened 
beyond the anti-puppeteering holding, while the final Section looks to 
recent scholarship on Klein, some of which would extend Klein much 
too far. 
B. Comfortably Broadening Klein 
Based on the more flexible view of reading precedent presented 
above, Klein comfortably can be read to support broader propositions 
than the narrowest, best-fitting anti-puppeteering holding.  The 
 
II.B.1. 
169. See DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 225–32, 240–45. 
170. See supra notes 137–54 and accompanying text (discussing Armstrong and the possible 
interpretations of the decision as they relate to Klein). 
171. Hart, supra note 4, at 1372–73. 
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possibilities are like an archery bull’s eye target of concentric rings, 
with more general readings as one moves from center to periphery.172   
At some point, the generalization becomes too broad to be a plausible 
reading of the past, and misses the target entirely.  I now think that 
Klein can be reasonably generalized beyond the bull’s eye proposition 
that Congress cannot force the federal courts to decide cases while 
ignoring substantive constitutional rights. 
At a higher, yet appealing level of generality, Klein can be seen as 
prohibiting unwarranted intrusions into federal courts’ processes for 
deciding cases.  This prohibition, implicit in Article III and vaguely 
identified and used in Klein in one context, easily extends to other 
subsets of the same general circumstances of unreasonable interference 
with courts’ decision processes.  In one of those subsets, Klein can be 
seen as recognizing limits on Congress’s control of the fact-finding 
processes of federal courts when such courts are left open to issue 
judgments on the merits in constitutional cases.  In another, Klein would 
extend to support Article III-based limits on statutory control of federal 
courts’ interpretative processes, even in cases of purely statutory 
interpretation involving no constitutional questions.  Surely there are 
fewer and less stringent limits on Congress’s regulation of courts’ 
statutory interpretation than their constitutional interpretation.  But it is 
appealing to see Article III-based limits on both, in ways that implicate 
Klein’s concern with interference in the process left open to decide a 
case. 
However, a comfortable generalization of Klein reaches its limits, 
and goes entirely off the archery target, before one gets to Martin 
Redish and Christopher Pudelski’s reading of Klein to prohibit court 
enforcement of statutes that significantly deceive the public.173  The 
broadened reading of Klein proposed in this Article is animated (as was 
Klein itself) by concerns about separation of powers and the degree to 
which Congress can instruct courts, in deciding cases, how to use the 
Constitution, find facts, and interpret law.  The even broader Redish and 
Pudelski reading urges courts—those whose decisional processes are 
not in most circumstances hamstrung by Congress—to read the 
Constitution through Klein’s lens to create an individual right to non-
misleading laws.174  If generalization is to have limits, then Klein’s core 
 
172. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 225–32, 240–45. 
173. Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of 
Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 
100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 461 (2006).  
174. See infra notes 248–51 and accompanying text (discussing Redish and Pudelski’s view of 
Klein). 
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concern was about separation of powers and not a general right of those 
affected by laws not to be misled.  Additionally, as discussed below, the 
particular individual right is not one that would be advisable or likely 
for a court to find implicit in the structure of the Constitution or any of 
its individual rights provisions. 
1. How Klein Might Limit Congressional Regulation of Judicial Fact-
Finding 
a. Rules of Law, Factual Presumptions, and Klein 
Originally, I rejected a suggestion by commentators that Klein limits 
Congress’s ability to dictate to Article III courts what facts they must 
find and how they must find them.175  The rejected inference was that 
Klein struck down a requirement in the 1870 Act that a court find a 
pardonee guilty of supporting the Confederacy if he had accepted a 
pardon without protesting his innocence at the time he received it.176  
Then, it seemed crucial to me that this provision had not been applied in 
Klein, since the plaintiff in the Court of Claims had stipulated that he 
had been guilty of supporting the Confederacy.  He relied on the legal 
effects of the pardon he had received, and not on a factual claim of 
actual innocence.177 
Surely, if one reads Klein narrowly, then it contains no such holding.  
If, however, one reads Klein slightly more broadly, the case can easily 
be seen as generally condemning any method of regulation that unduly 
interferes with the courts’ processes for applying the correct law to facts 
in cases over which it has jurisdiction to render a judgment on the 
merits.178  This includes some legislation apparently addressing fact-
finding processes.  Dealing in perverse ways with facts made relevant 
by law undermines the law itself. 
There are several ways Congress might be or seems to be tampering 
with judicial fact-finding.  First, Congress might try to define a 
constitutionally crucial fact in a way at odds with the explicit or implicit 
constitutional criteria for the existence of that fact.  Second, Congress 
might try to create presumptions concerning the existence of such facts 
 
175. Young, Klein Revisited, supra note 1, at 1233–35.  
176. Id. at 1235. 
177. Id. at 1236.  
178. One can evade a legal rule by, on the one hand, not applying it or applying a different 
rule, or, on the other hand, by means of distorting the facts that the rule makes crucial.  Reading a 
rule only against intentional killing as covering non-intentional ones flouts it.  So does applying 
the right rule to a mistaken finding that a killing was intentional.  A fact-finding process that is 
seriously flawed or intentionally skewed against particular rights can undermine the law itself as 
much as a mistake about the rule’s content. 
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based on supposed correlative facts it specifies.  And third, Congress 
might try to provide inadequate procedures—e.g., notice, lack of cross 
examination, etc.—for finding the facts, even if the court was permitted 
to discover the relevant facts as defined by the Constitution.  The first 
two of these forms are simply puppeteering in slight disguise.  Even 
read narrowly, Klein condemns them.179  Only the third would go 
beyond puppeteering as I originally saw it.180  These three forms are 
discussed in the next three Subsections.  I now think that Klein should 
be seen as extending to, and condemning, the third form as well. 
(1) Substantive Error Disguised as Regulation of Fact-Finding 
The first two of these three forms of regulation do not really involve 
interference with the fact-finding processes, except to the extent that 
changing any legal rule changes the facts that are relevant to its 
operation.  A legal rule simply is a device to map certain facts to 
required outcomes.  Often, the mapping is extremely complex and the 
meaning of parts of a rule is textually unclear and must be developed by 
a court through interpretation.  But at bottom, a rule of constitutional 
law, as fully explicated by the courts, is such a mapping.  Giving 
Congress power to change the definition of the facts that constitutional 
rules make operative would be the same thing as giving it the power to 
change the Constitution itself.  Imagine a statute that provides that 
human detainees at Guantanamo are not “persons” for purposes of the 
Fifth Amendment protections and thus, for that reason, are not entitled 
to due process.181  Courts would not enforce that provision182—a 
statutory requirement that courts use an incorrect definition of the facts 
 
179. These Klein violations would take the form of statutes requiring courts to decide cases 
using (1) the wrong definition of the facts the Constitution makes crucial, including the use of 
statutory irrebuttable presumptions, or (2) rebuttable presumptions of such facts, based on proof 
of another fact, at least if the effect is to weaken the constitutional rights in question without a 
sufficiently good reason of evidentiary efficiency.  These two forms are discussed in Part 
II.B.1.a.(1)–(2), infra.  In many cases the suspect presumptions are hard to understand as 
springing from anything other than a motive to weaken constitutional rights by indirect means.  
Both of these patterns are the equivalent of the statutory requirement, struck down in Klein, that a 
court decide a case but not apply all constitutional requirements in doing so. 
180. This form would not stop courts from using the right law including legal definitions, but 
would hamstring the process of fairly developing evidence to prove those facts.  I suggest that 
Article III carries with it a requirement of fair procedures analogous to those required by 
procedural due process, but springing from Article III and not necessarily coextensive.  See infra 
Part II.B.1.b. 
181. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting the federal government from depriving persons 
of “life, liberty or property, without due process of law”).  For a more general discussion, see 
infra Part II.C. 
182. Though in a way, one might make a credible metaphorical claim that that is what 
Congress is doing more generally. 
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made operative by the Constitution is clearly unconstitutional under 
Marbury.183  Klein’s core holding says that Congress’s jurisdictional 
powers do not override Marbury.184 
The second form of judicial fact-finding regulation—conclusive 
presumptions as to constitutionally operative facts—presents a similar 
problem.  If the criteria for some operative fact are established by 
judicial interpretation, Congress might try to create a presumption of the 
fact’s existence or non-existence based on some correlative fact or facts.  
For example, the statute struck in Klein created a conclusive 
presumption that receipt of a pardon without proclaiming one’s 
innocence conclusively established guilt.  But conclusive presumptions 
are rules of law and, in constitutional cases, cannot be used to change 
constitutional requirements.185 
Such congressional tampering with constitutionally compelled 
definitions is simply an instance of substantive unconstitutionality, 
which can be declared by any Article III court that is open with 
unimpaired jurisdiction.  After Klein, a statute violates Article III if the 
law purports to confer jurisdiction generally on Article III courts to 
decide a set of cases, but not to use the correct definitions of facts 
required by the Constitution.  And then it would be a violation of the 
center bull’s eye holding—the anti-puppeteering holding—that 
Congress cannot force federal courts to decide cases while withholding 
jurisdiction to apply the courts’ own reading of the Constitution. 
 
183. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803) (striking down portions 
of a statute read to assign the Supreme Court original jurisdiction but conflicting with limitations 
on Supreme Court jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution).  Marbury is often seen as the 
interpretive fountainhead of the Court’s power to review federal statutes.  See ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 39 (3d ed. 2006). 
184. The Court in Marbury concluded that, in properly deciding a case, it is bound by 
legislative texts in hierarchical order and must invalidate acts of Congress that conflict with a 
statute when it is necessary to do so in applying law to decide a case.  A puppeteering law, if the 
Court permitted it, would make it impossible for it to perform its duty of judicial review as 
defined and rationalized in Marbury.  See supra note 85 and accompanying text (quoting the 
relevant portion of the Marbury decision).  
185. Conclusive presumptions are entirely different matters.  Courts no longer scrutinize them 
if they simply move a statute’s meaning to a different place that is within Congress’s power to 
legislate.  If Congress can regulate the growing of lemons and plums in certain ways, it can do so 
by means of a statute that defines lemons as including plums and then just regulate lemons.  
Redish and Pudelski might see constitutional difficulties, associated with Klein, with the 
deceptiveness of such a statute if it were opaque to the public, even though not to the courts.  See 
discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the scholarship of Redish and Pudelski, which finds a 
holding in Klein against substantially deceptive legislation of all sorts).  But I reject both the 
attribution to Klein and that there is or should be a constitutional rule with such content.  So do 
some, but not all, of the commentators whose work I discuss below.  See infra note 205 and 
accompanying text (comparing the Anti-Injunction Act with Mitchum v. Foster’s finding that the 
Civil Rights Act was within the exception of the anti-injunction statute).  
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(2) Rebuttable Presumptions Based on Probabilities 
Perhaps not all rebuttable presumptions as to the existence of facts 
made operative by the Constitution are the same.  It is possible that 
Congress’s powers—real, but less than absolute—over the processes of 
the federal courts include a power to create reasonable rebuttable 
presumptions even as to the existence of facts made crucial by the 
Constitution to the resolution of certain claims.186  One might ask where 
Congress gets affirmative power to regulate constitutional rights.  The 
most plausible answer is Congress’s enforcement powers under the last 
sections of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments entail 
some such power as the rights created by those amendments.187  But 
even so, the Court has made clear that laws under these Amendments, 
which help enforce rights created by the Constitution, will be upheld if 
they do not change the substance of the right involved.188  And of 
course Congress has no powers to adjust the content of other rights if 
courts are open to hear claims based on them.  Thus, not only would 
courts independently review conclusive presumptions that are 
inconsistent with such rights, but would also review perverse, non-
conclusive presumptions concerning facts made operative by 
constitutional provisions. 
On Klein’s facts, the presumption operated conclusively as a rule of 
law at odds with the Constitution by providing that a pardoned person, 
who had not asserted innocence, would be excluded from recovery.189  
Klein did not protest innocence when he received his pardon; rather, he 
stipulated that he had been guilty of supporting the Confederacy.190  
Thus, as applied to Klein, the presumption operated conclusively and 
was a case of standard puppeteering, forcing on the courts Congress’s 
version of constitutionally defined operative facts.191 
Read at a more general level, concerning non-interference with 
 
186. Congress’s powers over federal courts’ procedural and evidentiary matters might allow 
some such regulation, but surely is restricted so that the constitutional right in question is not 
unduly limited.  For a more general discussion, see infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
187. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.”); id. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”); id. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall 
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). 
188. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (“Congress’ power under § 5, 
however, extends only to ‘enforc[ing]’ the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court 
has described this power as ‘remedial.’  The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are 
inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.” (citation omitted)). 
189. See supra note 185 and accompanying text discussing conclusive presumptions. 
190. Young, Klein Revisited, supra note 1, at 1236. 
191. Id.  
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Article III courts’ decision processes on the merits of a constitutional 
case, Klein comfortably reaches far enough to limit Congress’s powers 
to legislate non-conclusive presumptions of constitutionally crucial 
facts.  Klein can be seen as not permitting a weakening of constitutional 
rights by means of unjustified, probabilistic requirements for their 
enforcement.  Imagine a statute providing that a policeman, who has 
taken a course regarding the appropriate use of force, is entitled to a 
presumption that he did not commit police brutality whenever accused.  
Further, assume that the presumption is rebuttable only if a plaintiff 
suing him proves “beyond a reasonable doubt” facts constituting 
unlawful force under the Constitution.  Surely the consistency of this 
presumption with the legal rule it undermines is a substantial 
constitutional question for the courts.  Perhaps Congress has some 
power to regulate the efficiency of the enforcement of rights by creating 
rebuttable presumptions.192  But, at least if the presumptions are 
unreasonable, as a practical matter, they unjustifiably alter the nature of 
the right itself.  It is strongly arguable that Klein’s anti-puppeteering 
holding securely extends to allowing courts to strongly scrutinize 
Congress’s indirect control of constitutional meaning through 
probabilistic presumptions. 
b. Klein and Article III as a Source of Minimally Fair Fact-Finding 
Procedures 
Klein may be fairly interpreted to read Article III as requiring 
Congress—even when it is not tampering with constitutional definitions 
as to facts—to allow minimally fair process for the finding of those 
crucial facts.  This places Klein in what is usually the realm of 
procedural due process.193  Is fair process confined only to 
 
192. See infra note 203 (discussing Congress’s power over court processes and the limits on 
those powers). 
193. The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively, require 
the federal government and state governments not to deprive persons of life, liberty or property 
without according them “due process.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.  For the 
most part, due process is a guarantee of fair judicial style procedure.  If a government takes 
judicial style action, either in a court or executive branch agency, that threatens a person’s life, 
liberty, or property interests, then the government must allow him procedures to develop facts 
demonstrating that such deprivation is not warranted under law.  For example, an accused 
criminal must have a reasonable chance to call witnesses and cross-examine those against him in 
order to prove that he did not commit the crime charged.  Or, to take an example of a civil 
proceeding, a defendant must be allowed fair procedures to develop facts showing that he did not 
commit a civil infraction warranting seizure of his property.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, §§ 
7.1–7.4, at 545–602.  For a helpful, compact discussion, see Todd G. Consenza, Note, Preserving 
Procedural Due Process for Legal Immigrants Receiving Food Stamps in Light of the Personal 
Responsibility Act of 1996, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2065, 2068–77 (1997) (discussing the 
development and basic requirements of procedural due process).  In a separate line of cases, the 
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constitutional cases to which the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment is 
applicable?  And, where those Amendments are applicable, are the only 
procedures that are constitutionally required those that stem from those 
Amendments? 
The right to habeas corpus existed even before the first of these 
sources of fair procedure.194  For habeas cases before the enactment of 
the Fifth Amendment, could Congress have specified any procedure no 
matter how skimpy or perverse?  Boumediene v. Bush provides an 
example of implying constitutional requirements of fair procedure in 
Constitutional provisions which simply contemplate that federal courts 
will decide cases.  Rarely discussed about the Boumediene case195 is its 
holding that, independently of any due process requirements, the 
Constitution’s habeas requirements implicitly require minimally fair 
procedures for finding facts crucial to claims of liberty.196 
 
Supreme Court has interpreted due process to have a substantive component that severely limited 
the enactment of legislation that cuts into fundamental rights recognized by the Court (such as a 
right to abortion in certain circumstances and the right to use birth control methods).  For a 
discussion of this separate line of cases, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–47 
(1992) (“Although a literal reading of the [Due Process] Clause might suggest that it governs only 
the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty, for at least 105 years, since 
Mugler v. Kansas, the Clause has been understood to contain a substantive component as well, 
one ‘barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to 
implement them.’  As Justice Brandeis (joined by Justice Holmes) observed, ‘despite arguments 
to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.  
Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal 
Constitution from invasion by the States.’” (citations omitted)). 
194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
195. In Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), the Court found for the first time a federal 
statute unconstitutional on grounds that it violated the Suspension Clause.  Given reliance on the 
Suspension Clause, the opinion says nothing bearing on judicial review limitations for non-
habeas corpus claims to review of unconstitutional action and laws, such as those allegedly 
depriving a would-be plaintiff of a federal court forum.  
196. Boumediene states: 
Even if we were to assume that the [Combatant Status Review Tribunals] satisfy due 
process standards, it would not end our inquiry.  Habeas corpus is a collateral process 
that exists, in Justice Holmes’ words, to “cu[t] through all forms and g[o] to the very 
tissue of the structure.  It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the 
proceedings, and although every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry 
whether they have been more than an empty shell.”  Even when the procedures 
authorizing detention are structurally sound, the Suspension Clause remains applicable 
and the writ relevant . . . .  
Although we make no judgment whether the CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy 
due process standards, we agree with petitioners that, even when all the parties 
involved in this process act with diligence and in good faith, there is considerable risk 
of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact.  This is a risk inherent in any process that, in 
the words of the former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, is “closed and 
accusatorial.”  And given that the consequence of error may be detention of persons for 
the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more, this is a risk too 
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It seems fair to read Klein as implying a similar conclusion under 
Article III: Article III courts, left open to hear constitutional cases, must 
be allowed to use minimally fair procedure to decide facts that 
constitutional law makes vital to the outcome.197  Of course, no 
constraint on fact-finding operated in Klein, where the parties stipulated 
to facts.198  Nonetheless, a rule concerning such constraints might be 
seen as a subset of wrongs in a broader view of Klein—one that protects 
Article III courts’ decision processes in constitutional cases.  A court 
that is not given ample latitude to determine facts made operative by the 
Constitution is not able to effectively apply appropriate legal rules.  To 
offer an extreme example, would a statute that required that facts be 
found by a Ouija board be consistent with the independence of courts 
under Article III?  Surely the legitimate debate is not about whether 
there are limits in Article III, but rather, to what lengths those limits 
extend.  Thus, one might say that a correct understanding of Klein’s 
broader concerns about non-interference with courts’ decision processes 
includes hamstringing the courts’ ability to find facts in a reasonable 
way under all of the circumstances. 
Perhaps this aspect of judicial independence is simply a matter of 
historical interest because courts have had to accord procedural due 
process in cases challenging federal action since 1791 and in those 
challenging state action since 1868.199  Yet, the Boumediene Court not 
only held that habeas itself was a source of procedural requirements, but 
it also suggested that those requirements might in some circumstances 
exceed those of due process.200  Analogously, it seems possible that the 
availability of procedures from Article III might turn out to be 
significant in future cases.  Perhaps such minimal procedures could be 
seen as a matter of minimal judicial integrity and not waiveable by the 
parties, at least on the same terms, as other procedural rights. 
 
significant to ignore.  
For the writ of habeas corpus, or its substitute, to function as an effective and proper 
remedy in this context, the court that conducts the habeas proceeding must have the 
means to correct errors that occurred during the CSRT proceedings.  
Id. at 785–86 (citations omitted). 
197. If courts are to be open to apply facts to law, and if this is not simply appearance or a 
sham, that implies that there must be some procedures minimally directed to developing the facts 
the law makes relevant.  Thus, just as the requirement that habeas corpus be available in some 
circumstances implies some minimally fair set of procedures, it seems likewise proper to read 
Article III that way. 
198. Young, Klein Revisited, supra note 1, at 1236–37. 
199. U.S. CONST. amend. V (1791); id. amend. XIV (1868). 
200. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785 (“Even if we were to assume that the CSRTs satisfy 
due process standards, it would not end our inquiry [as to the adequacy of certain procedures for 
judicial review of confinement under the Military Commissions Act].”). 
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2. Klein and Limits on Regulation of Statutory Interpretation 
Are there limits on Congress’s control of how courts interpret statutes 
under circumstances implicating no constitutional rights other than this 
separation of powers question?  If Congress can enact any one of a 
number of rules consistently with other provisions of the Constitution, 
then it may reach those results by the alternate means of guiding 
statutory interpretation.  This is the position that some scholars take in 
recent scholarship on Klein.201  While this position seems sound in 
 
201. “There is no such thing as Congress compelling a court to speak a ‘statutory untruth’—
no such thing as limiting or controlling judicial interpretive authority or independent judgment 
on matters of statutory substance.”  Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, supra note 2, at 229 
(emphasis added).  But perhaps, if pressed, Wasserman might recognize some limits.  He cites 
some of the relatively sparse literature on limits of Congress’s control of interpretation.  See id. at 
232 n.135 (arguing that there is a general consensus that Congress has the ability to define 
statutory terms because it is an inherent indication of legislative power).  But he cites it for the 
clearly correct position that Congress may control statutory or treaty definitions.  Of the two 
sources he cites, one finds no limits, in separation of powers law alone, on congressional 
regulation of creation and interpretation of statutory meaning.  Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, 
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2086, 2127 (2002).  Rosenkranz 
would allow virtually all regulation of statutory interpretation that a later Congress theoretically 
might discover and repeal.  Id.  For me, the issue is not theoretical susceptibility to repeal, but 
whether a set of such regulations very seriously burdens current courts and legislatures in their 
respective processes of uttering and decoding statutes. 
 In that footnote, Wasserman cites one other article.  Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, 
supra note 2, at 232 n.135 (citing Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is To Be Master,” the Judiciary or the 
Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 
880, 882 (2009)).  He cites this article for the unobjectionable proposition that Congress has 
much control over the definition of words used in statutes and treaties.  Id. at 232.  But Jellum 
makes clear the plausibility of separation of powers limits on more general regulations of courts’ 
interpretive process.  Jellum, supra, at 880–82. 
 I believe there are some such limits and see them as easily fitting into my Dworkinian 
expansion of Klein’s holding.  But I disagree with important specifics of Jellum’s argument.  It 
depends on a distinction between formalism and functionalism in constitutional interpretation.  
She argues that the former position alone condemns statutory limits on all general methods of 
statutory interpretation, while both positions would balk at legislative imposition of theories of 
interpretation, e.g., textualism.  Id. at 842, 847–52, 856–57, 890–97.  My view is that courts 
should make more complex and particularized decisions about whether regulation of 
interpretation unduly hamstrings the functioning of courts or of later Congresses. 
 As for Jellum’s first distinction, formalism and functionalism are not sufficiently differentiated 
in this context.  Unless a textual rule is very clear —e.g., a President must be thirty-five years old 
—even formalists need to understand the plausible underlying policy in order to initially 
determine the content of the rule that they will ultimately recognize to fill the textual void.  Any 
rules limiting Congress’s regulation of interpretation will be found, not in clear Constitutional 
text, but to be implicit in the Constitution’s structure.  Thus, the formalist/functionalist distinction 
is especially unhelpful concerning these sorts of limits.  As for the second distinction, are 
interpretative methods usefully distinct from theories?  Do not various versions of the plain 
meaning canon of interpretation entail theoretical textualism to some degree or another? 
 Nevertheless, the thrust of Jellum’s article makes the point that it is not enough simply to say, 
without defense, that Congress is in absolute control of how statutes are to be interpreted by 
courts.  See generally Jellum, supra (discussing how the legislature may violate the separation of 
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many circumstances, in others, as discussed below, it raises serious 
separation of powers problems that implicate Klein’s more general 
concerns with protecting federal courts’ decisional processes. 
If, for example, Congress directly can regulate both avocados and 
lemons in a certain way, then surely it can do so by drafting legislation 
dealing with “avocados,” and instructing courts to interpret that word as 
meaning both avocados and lemons in their ordinary sense.202  This is a 
clear set of instructions to the courts concerning a substantive set of 
outcomes that it is within Congress’s power to mandate.  However, 
there must be some limits under Article III on congressional 
interference with courts’ methods of interpreting ambiguous statutory 
language, and these are easily seen as associated with Klein.  Read 
broadly, Klein invalidates unreasonable congressional interference with 
courts’ decision processes when they are left open to decide cases on 
the merits.  Indefinite limits that one Congress attempts to place on the 
conversation between future Congresses and courts pose a threat to the 
proper functioning of both bodies.  As we will see, the Anti-Injunction 
Act of 1793 raises these questions.203  But even some regulations of the 
judicial interpretation process, placed within a single statute to govern 
its own interpretation, can also constitute an overreach of Congress’s 
powers to control the courts. 
a. Restrictions on Interpretation Projected Forward 
Let’s return to avocados and lemons.  Suppose a statute provides that 
in future legislation and unless this statute is repealed, “avocado” 
includes lemons in their ordinary linguistic sense.  Can one Congress 
validly control the terms of the future legislative conversation in this 
way?  If one thinks this fanciful, one might see the Anti-Injunction Act 
 
powers when attempting to control the interpretive process of the judicial power).  Whatever the 
scope of such limits, it seems fair to see Klein’s proto-concerns, those generally about Congress 
unduly crossing the line protecting the independence of courts, to be concerns encompassing this 
form of regulation. 
202. In recent writings on Klein, Howard Wasserman also rejects the Redish and Pudelski 
view.  His rejection of the broader proposition is simply based on the unelaborated view that 
Congress is the master of sub-constitutional (statutes and treaties) law, with the power to amend 
it.  Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, supra note 2, at 218–35 (rejecting Steven Vladeck’s 
Klein-based challenge to the deceptiveness of various provisions of the MCA on grounds that 
Congress is the master of sub-constitutional law and can change it, largely however it wishes, by 
statute).  In a separate section below, I further elaborate reasons for rejecting the broad anti-
deception view of Klein.  See infra part II.C. 
203. Act of Mar. 2 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 stat. 224 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 
(2006)).  The Anti-Injunction Act reads: “A court of the United States may not grant an 
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, 
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”  Id.  See 
infra Part II.B.2.a (discussing the Anti-Injunction Act). 
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of 1793204 as raising this question and Mitchum v. Foster as ducking 
it.205  The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits federal courts from enjoining 
state court proceedings unless expressly authorized by Congress.206  
Section 1983 of the federal civil rights laws, enacted during 
Reconstruction, is designed to robustly enforce the civil rights created 
by the Fourteenth Amendment by suits at law and in equity.207  But 
section 1983 nowhere expressly provides for injunctions against state 
court proceedings, not even for those proceedings that might be used in 
the most devastating way to frustrate Fourteenth Amendment rights.  It 
is very likely that, in drafting section 1983, Congress wanted such 
injunctions available for cases in which legal remedies, such as 
damages, would not fully protect the Fourteenth Amendment right.208 
Must the Reconstruction Congress follow the 1793 Congress’s 
instructions (as long as not formally repealed) regarding how to speak if 
they want to accomplish a result?  Or do courts have a duty to 
understand, as best as they can, what the Congress that wrote a 
particular statute intended by its language?  The former would be a 
burden on future Congresses to speak a certain way and on the courts to 
interpret a certain way.  Imagine the burden on official speakers and 
readers of federal legislation as the linguistic rulebook they must 
master, to speak and decode, becomes thicker and less intuitive over the 
 
204. Id. 
205. Compare Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, with Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 
226, 242–43 (1972) (holding that § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act is “within the ‘expressly 
authorized’ exception of the anti-injunction statute”).  Mitchum found that § 1983 contains the 
express authorization of an injunction to stop state proceedings that is required by the earlier 
Anti-Injunction Act, despite the fact that § 1983 never mentions injunctions against such judicial 
action.  Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243. 
206. See Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (detailing that a U.S. court may only grant an 
injunction to stay proceedings in a state court when expressly authorized by a congressional act, 
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments). 
207. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), titled “Civil action for deprivation of rights,” states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against 
a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, 
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or 
declaratory relief was unavailable.  For the purposes of this section, any Act of 
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a 
statute of the District of Columbia. 
208. The Supreme Court has described § 1983 as enacted to make the newly created 
Fourteenth Amendment rights enforceable against recalcitrance of state officers, including 
judicial officers, and that it was part of a great transformation of the state-federal relationship 
after the Civil War.  Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 238–39, 242–43. 
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years.  That is inconsistent with a fair understanding of Articles I and 
III, reasonably read together.  Congress and the courts share 
responsibility for developing the rules of the legislative language game 
in ways that must be worked out if their desires conflict.  That process 
involves two branches—one voicing commands and one interpreting 
and applying the commands. 
We now move beyond bizarre definitions, cast in terms of 
interpretation, to limitations on methods of reading words not further 
defined.  For example, can a Congress not just prohibit the use of 
legislative history in interpreting a specific statute, or perhaps for a 
specific Congress, but prohibit the use for the indefinite future until the 
prohibition is repealed?  Can one Congress prohibit courts’ use of 
specified linguistic or substantive canons of statutory interpretation for 
the indefinite future until repeal?  As to linguistic canons, judges give 
them the weight that they think that they deserve in decoding the words 
of a particular Congress—understood as an objective public expression, 
not cryptic private poetry.  In my view, it is for the courts to decide how 
to do this as long as they make a good faith effort to adhere to what is 
objectively and clearly expressed in the statute. 
As for substantive canons, conceivably some can be destroyed by 
legislation that provides for the indefinite future until repeal.  Perhaps 
Congress can generally declare that it often has an intention to legislate 
extraterritorial effects, destroying, until the declaration is repealed, the 
canon that presumes against such effects.  I have some doubts.  
Especially doubtful is Congress’s power to control, generally in the 
future, the courts’ invocation of the canon that legislation will be 
construed to avoid serious questions of its unconstitutionality, even 
against an interpretation that seems somewhat linguistically stronger.209  
This rule was developed by the courts partly to deal with the 
conjunction of its powers of judicial review and statutory interpretation.  
At least to some extent it is designed to force Congress to be careful as 
it approaches constitutional limits and to be very clear about which it 
intends to cover.  It is not clear to me that such a rule is within 
Congress’s control.  It seems that there must be some limits on the 
power of earlier Congresses to completely control how later ones speak 
and how interpreting courts’ determine the intentions of an enacting 
Congress. 
This seems a rule, developed by the courts partly to deal with the 
conjunction of its powers of judicial review and statutory interpretation, 
 
209. I have fewer, albeit real, concerns about such a declaration that operates only within the 
context of a particular statute. 
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which to some extent is designed to force Congress to be careful as it 
approaches constitutional limits and to be very clear when it violates 
them.  It is not clear to me that such a rule is within Congress’s control.  
Without further developing these thoughts, it seems that there must be 
some limits on earlier Congresses completely controlling how later ones 
speak and how interpreting courts’ read legislation. 
These cases of legislating interpretative rules for the indefinite future 
are problematic along two dimensions.  They make it difficult for a 
future Congress to know how to speak, and they require courts not just 
to read the difficult language that future Congresses provide but also to 
change interpretive methods.  This double-edged burden will sometimes 
be too much for each branch and far too great a burden on the 
legislative process as a whole.  For example, this Article will argue 
below that the War Crimes Act’s prohibition against the use of foreign 
or international law by the courts may unduly burden their role as 
interpreters. 
b. Controlling Interpretation Internally within a Statute or 
Contemporaneous Group of Statutes 
Even within a particular statute, there may be limits on Congress’s 
power to control the methods courts use to interpret laws.  Certainly, in 
drafting legislation, if Congress is clear enough for lawyers and judges 
to understand how it wants a statute to operate on the ground, it should 
not matter if it achieves that result by controlling interpretation.  But, 
when laws are unclear, must courts play the difficult game of not using 
particular canons or external helpful texts, if that is what Congress 
specifies?  This is not to suggest, as some do,210 that Klein requires 
Congress to make clear to the public a statute’s effect or risk 
invalidation on grounds of deception alone.  Such a rule would move 
beyond separation of powers to recognize problematic individual 
rights.211  The position that this Article advocates stays within that 
realm and suggests that Congress may structure the meaning of a statute 
so long as a court can interpret the law with reasonable ease and 
specificity.  Congress may make its intended results clear by using the 
language of interpretation as long as its intentions for the practical 
operation of a statute are clear. 
But what about instructions concerning the methods and materials 
courts may use to decipher indeterminate statutory instructions?  One 
 
210. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing Martin H. Redish and Christopher R. 
Pudelski’s broader interpretation of Klein’s holding as having more subtle implications). 
211. See infra note 222 and accompanying text (suggesting that Congress cannot limit or 
control the judicial interpretative authority or independent judgment on statutory interpretation). 
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provision of the 2006 Military Commissions Act provides: “No alien 
unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission 
under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of 
rights.”212  This provision could be read to prohibit use of the 
Conventions as mere background material for interpreting rights 
stemming from other laws.  This reading, however, is especially 
constitutionally problematic.  Nevertheless, the Military Commissions 
Act has now been softened in a way that likely eliminates the separation 
of powers issue.213 
Still existing is another troubling portion of the statutory 
superstructure of the War on Terror: “No foreign or international source 
of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the courts of the 
United States in interpreting the prohibitions enumerated in [the War 
Crimes Act].”214  If the precise intended effects of this provision on the 
outcome of an interpretation of the War Crimes Act are clear to courts, 
then courts must follow the clearly expressed intention of Congress.  
But suppose that the language, “basis for a rule of decision,” includes 
having some influence on interpreting ambiguous provisions of the War 
Crimes Act.  It seems an attractive reading of separation of powers to 
find limits on more vague statutory directions for courts not to use 
particular canons of interpretation or draw inspiration in reasoning from 
external legal sources.  When those limits are crossed, we have a 
tampering with the functioning of those courts in violation of Klein’s 
protection of Article III courts’ decision processes.  I would conjecture 
that true interpretation of laws starts when Congress has not been 
sufficiently clear.  At that point, courts must be left alone to interpret 
ambiguous laws. 
This is not formalism for formalism’s sake.  If that were so, it would 
entail that even a clear specification of a statute’s effect by means of 
controlling interpretation is a violation.215  Consider an analogy that 
 
212. Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109–366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2602 (2006) 
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g) (2006)), amended by Pub. L. No. 111–84, 123 Stat. 2575 (2009). 
213. “No alien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial by military commission under 
this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a basis for a private right of action.”  10 
U.S.C.A. § 948b(e) (West 2012).  This statute simply seems to exercise Congress’s prerogative to 
clearly control the domestic effect of treaties.  
214. Pub. L. No. 109–366, § 6(a)(2), 120 Stat. 2632 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C § 2441 
(2006)).  
215. By this I mean that formalism would say that in attempting to write rules that control the 
behavior of people and institutions within its regulatory powers, Congress must always 
accomplish its purpose by using clearer substantive language and never by using language 
instructing the court how to interpret other language.  This overly formalistic division of powers 
is non-functionally rigid.  If the interpretation instructions are clear enough to specify fairly clear 
substantive results, it makes no sense to prohibit that means of specifying substantive results.  But 
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aids understanding of the separation of powers stakes.  Under current 
broad constitutional rules permitting delegation of legislative power to 
agencies, Congress can be as clear and limiting as it wishes.  In the 
unclear areas, though, it has created functional legislative power in the 
Executive Branch.  Given the impossibility of complete clarity, this 
results in a shared, and at least temporarily separate, power over the 
state of the law that may be seen as a salutary spreading of authority.  It 
is reasonable to see this spreading as part of a constitutional separation 
of powers.  One might see a rule giving courts the authority to resolve 
ambiguity as a similar spreading of power.  Once Congress has written 
the text of statutes, it is up to courts, under the separation of powers, to 
decide—within the limits of linguistic good faith—how they will reason 
and from what materials they will reason, to fill genuine gaps in 
ambiguous laws.  Perhaps this argument is a more developed version of 
Justice Scalia’s views on judicial independence, presented recently in a 
speech to a foundation: “No one is more opposed to the use of foreign 
law than I am, but I’m darned if I think it’s up to Congress to direct the 
court how to make its decisions.”216 
The arguments above are somewhat similar to, but crucially different 
from, those debated by Howard Wasserman and Stephen Vladeck in 
two recent articles on Klein and the War on Terror.217  Vladeck would 
invalidate the provisions of the War on Terror discussed above on a 
reading of Klein that is too broad.  He adopts the recent reading of 
 
when the interpretive instructions as applied to the substantive portions of the statute do not lead 
to fairly particular results, Congress is no longer legislating results but telling the Court what 
generalized thought processes to use to resolve ambiguity created by its substantive language.  At 
some point, that cannot be determined in advance with formalistic clarity, Congress has 
encroached too much on the Court’s function. 
216. Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, supra note 2, at 233 (quoting Charles Lane, 
Scalia Tells Congress to Mind its Own Business, WASH. POST, May 19, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/18/AR2006051801961.html).  
Apparently, Wasserman believes that Scalia’s views on this matter do not extend to interpretation 
of subconstitutional law, which includes statutes, and indeed statutes specifying the domestic 
effect of treaties.  See id. (reconciling Scalia’s first position of adopting a broad, nationalist 
approach to congressional control over enforceability of treaties as domestic law in Medellin with 
his second position that Congress cannot direct the Court on how to make its decisions).  
217. See Vladeck, supra note 5, at 253 (interpreting the decision in Klein broadly so that 
legislation is attacked if interfering with legislative application); Wasserman, Constitutional 
Pathology, supra note 2, at 233 (arguing that Congress can change subsconstitutional law 
however it wishes by statute).  But I note that Scalia’s position that Congress is the master of 
subconstitutional law does not entail that it is the master of all issues of how such law, if 
ambiguous, will be interpreted, including the appropriate canons and methods of statutory 
interpretation.  My view expressed above is that there are limits on such congressional control of 
statutory interpretation.  It seems Wasserman disagrees with me or, possibly, that he has not 
considered this precise question of the appropriate sharing of power, between Congress and the 
judiciary, of power to determine subconstitutional law.  
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Martin Redish and Christopher Pudelski, critiqued below,218 that 
prohibits substantially deceptive legislation.219  This reading would 
condemn deceptive legislation regardless of whether it interferes with 
the law applying or interpreting the fact-finding process of federal 
courts.220  Howard Wasserman rejects the Redish and Pudelski view, as 
do I.221  As I read him, Wasserman would allow Congress to adjust 
subconstitutional law (statutory law including statutes adjusting treaties) 
nearly anyway it wishes.222  I agree with Wasserman that the confusing 
or deceptive nature of laws is not generally a ground for finding them 
unconstitutional.  But it seems, though it is hard to be certain, that he 
would allow Congress to very broadly control methods of statutory 
interpretation.223  Thus, I believe that Vladeck reads Klein too broadly, 
while Wasserman reads it slightly too narrowly.  The final Section of 
this Article contains the critique of Redish and Pudelski’s very broad 
reading of Klein.  First, this Article presents a case study that applies 
some of the arguments concerning Article III limits on statutory 
interference with the decision processes of courts to decide cases on the 
merits. 
 
218. See infra Part II.C (discussing Redish & Pudelski’s broader interpretation of Klein’s 
holding as having more subtle implications). 
219. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 173, at 438–39 (“What we derive from Klein, 
however, is a far more subtle precept of American political theory: that the judiciary has the 
constitutional power and obligation to assure that Congress has not deceived the electorate as to 
the manner in which its legislation actually alters the preexisting legal, political, social, or 
economic topography.”). 
220. See id. at 439 (“The legislative deception that is of concern . . . does not go to the 
legislators’ private motivation in enacting the legislation, or what incidental or collateral effects 
the legislation may have, beyond its direct and immediate impact.  Instead, we are focused 
exclusively on the much more fundamental concern about deception as to what the legislation 
actually does.”). 
221. See Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, supra note 2, at 218–35 (arguing that 
Congress alone is the master of subconstitutional law). 
222. Id. at 218–35. 
223. See id. at 229–30 (“There is no such thing as Congress compelling a court to speak a 
‘statutory untruth’—no such thing as limiting or controlling judicial interpretive authority or 
independent judgment on matters of statutory substance.”). 
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3. Klein and Habeas Corpus: A Case Study in Interference with Courts’ 
Decision Processes 
There is one interesting, distressing, and especially problematic 
setting in which Klein arguments have been rejected by the Supreme 
Court, but in which such arguments deserve explicit and more careful 
consideration than they seemed to receive in response to the briefs filed.  
A part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
provides: 
 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in 
State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding.224 
In Williams v. Taylor,225 the habeas petitioner argued that these 
provisions should be read narrowly, as not requiring federal courts 
exercising post-conviction habeas jurisdiction to defer to any state court 
readings of the Constitution that they believed wrong; and that, if read 
broadly, these provisions violated separation of powers as explicated in 
Klein.226  In Williams, the Supreme Court, with four dissents, adopted a 
reading that would, in some cases, require a federal habeas court to 
defer to state court interpretations of the Constitution that the federal 
 
224. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2) (2006). 
225. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402–13 (2000) (ignoring arguments presented 
based on Klein, the Court upheld requirements that federal judges, in habeas corpus proceedings 
brought by convicted state prisoners, defer to readings of the federal Constitution made by state 
courts in upholding convictions).  The restrictions are found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).  
226. Brief for Petitioner at 48–54, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (No. 98-8384), 1999 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 729, at *84–85 (arguing the unconstitutionality, under Klein, of a broad 
reading of AEDPA); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (No. 98-
8384), 1999 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1200, at *66 (arguing the unconstitutionality, under Klein, 
of a broad reading of AEDPA); see also Brief for Professors Lance G. Banning, Jack N. Rakove, 
William W. Van Alstyne, & Gordon G. Young as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Williams 
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (No. 98-8384), 1999 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 730, at *35, 40–42, 44, 
47–48 (arguing for a rejection of the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of AEDPA resulting in state 
courts ruling on matters of federal law control despite federal courts finding them erroneous).  
The Court granted certiorari on questions other than the direct constitutional one, including the 
statutory interpretation questions.  Williams, 529 U.S. at 367.  Arguments about the 
constitutionality of readings of AEDPA, however, remained open, because the Court reads 
statutes to avoid constitutionally problematic constructions when it can.  
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courts thought were wrong.227  These were interpretations of the federal 
Constitution by the state courts—made at the time of their decision 
affirming a conviction—which were in some sense wrong, but not 
unreasonable. 
There are a number of possible justifications that might be put 
forward for the conclusion that such regulation is consistent with a 
reasonably independent federal judiciary.  One might argue that, while 
Congress does not control the meaning of the Constitution, it has some 
legislative control over the retroactivity of later decisions broadening 
rights over criminal convictions that were final before those later 
decisions.  This argument is of disputable validity.  But even assuming 
that Congress wields some power to regulate retroactivity, this would 
simply entail that constitutional law, not recognized until a later time, 
cannot be used in certain circumstances to overturn earlier convictions.  
It would not mean that states could be made the largely final arbiters of 
what the law was at the time of conviction.  Equally problematic is the 
limitation on what sources of law count in determining the law or the 
clarity of law at the time.  The federal habeas statute applied in Williams 
provides that such an earlier constitutional right cannot be sufficiently 
clear unless it stems from Supreme Court precedent.228  Not even 
unanimous agreement of the circuit courts at the time of conviction 
would suffice.  This is an extremely serious interference with the effects 
of lower federal court decisions and the constitutional reasoning of 
federal courts in deciding a constitutional case. 
One might also argue that post-conviction habeas corpus 
consideration is a privilege—unlike the right to habeas consideration of 
purely executive detention not following a determination of rights in a 
state or federal court.229  An example of the latter right is detention by 
 
227. Williams, 529 U.S. at 399–414 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
228. The federal habeas statute provides, in relevant part, that: 
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant 
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 
claim— 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States . . . . 
 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
229. Until Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), state convictions that were even minimally 
procedurally fair were not subject to scrutiny by federal courts via habeas corpus.  The state court 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were preclusive; thus, they could be reviewed in federal 
court only by a superior court—the U.S. Supreme Court.  Brown rested on a rereading of the 
federal habeas statutes, not on recognition of a constitutional right to habeas.  FALLON ET AL., 
supra note 3, at 1220–35.  My own view is that due process should be interpreted to require that 
some post-conviction relief must be available to assess powerful claims to innocence.  See George 
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the military or government mental health officials.230  In either case, 
habeas is a right.  It might be the only method of testing the validity of 
detention.  Thus such cases present the most compelling claims of right 
to a habeas corpus hearing. 
Post-conviction cases following criminal trials and appeals are 
different in ways that make claims to entitlement weaker.  Under 
current law, except perhaps in extraordinary circumstances, it is not 
clear that post-conviction federal habeas corpus is constitutionally 
required. 231  But whether that should settle the matter, given the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, remains unclear.232  Indeed, 
Vladeck’s narrower use of the Redish and Pudelski anti-deception view 
of Klein seems more attractive in these specific circumstances.  Here 
this is risk of public confusion about basic criminal justice in the United 
States, and the possibility of demeaning the highest officials in an 
independent branch.  This view is much more limited than Redish and 
Pudelski’s general anti-deception view of Klein because it is limited to 
separation of powers issues, specifically the giving of false appearances 
that courts are functioning independently. 
The deference to fact-finding in the habeas provision233 could also be 
 
C. Thomas III, Gordon G. Young, Keith Sharfman & Kate B. Briscoe, Is it Ever Too Late for 
Innocence? Finality, Efficiency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 263, 266 (2003) 
(arguing that while it should never be too late to achieve post-conviction relief, this statement 
must be qualified, and strong evidence is needed to overcome a conviction previously rendered by 
fair process). 
230. See, e.g., Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872) (reviewing an attempted state 
habeas corpus action to free a person detained in the federal military). 
231. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 1238–39 (discussing post-conviction federal habeas 
corpus).  Indeed, there is a greater open question as to whether any review of a trial court decision 
is required.  Put another way, would denying appellate review across the board (to avoid equal 
protection problems) violate the Constitution?  For a discussion of Supreme Court cases pointing 
toward finding no such right, see Alex S. Ellerson, Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate 
Procedural Reform, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 373, 375–76 (1991).  But see id. at 377–404 (arguing 
that the Court should recognize such a right in some circumstances and that newer decisions are 
somewhat difficult to square with this hard line position). 
232. Sometimes a power over the existence of an institution does not entail complete control 
over how it functions.  For example, the Court has found a right to counsel and transcripts for 
indigents on their first appeal from a conviction without ever finding that there is right to such an 
appeal at all.  For a discussion of these cases and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see 
generally supra note 59. 
233. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2006): 
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim 
that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of 
the claim— 
. . . . 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
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targeted under a reasonably expanded reading of Klein.  If restricting 
habeas courts’ abilities to find the underlying facts unduly interferes 
with Article III courts’ judicial function, then there is arguably a 
violation of the judicial independence required by Article III as 
explicated in Klein.234  Certainly, if the statutory standard required 
federal habeas courts to accept state court fact-findings unless the 
chance that they were right was negligible or less, then that would seem 
beyond Congress’s power to impose.  Read broadly, Klein invites 
federal judges to determine just how much power Congress has to write 
standards of review or presumptions in constitutional rights cases.235  
However, there are good reasons why reviewing courts ought to defer to 
trial court and jury findings of fact, and why, perhaps, Congress should 
be able to adjust this deference within a reasonable range.236  Whether  
 
234. It may be a violation of Article III, as explicated in Klein, to open a federal habeas court 
that need not be open but to hamstring its decisions.  In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 
(1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355–56 (1963), the Court was careful not to 
hold that states are obligated to provide appeals after convictions in trial courts.  However, it did 
hold, respectively, that if it made such appeals generally available, it must provide counsel and 
transcripts to indigents.  This jurisprudence seems best termed a contingent fundamental due 
process right that is subject to strict equality requirements if the state creates it.  See supra note 59 
and accompanying text (dealing generally with unconstitutional conditions on interests whose 
existence is not required by the Constitution). 
235. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Klein and the limits on regulation of 
statutory interpretation). 
236. The reasons include the efficiency of having facts found once, and by a decider who has 
seen the demeanor of witnesses, and who has seen the whole context of a piece of evidence in 
other evidence, both testimonial and documentary. 
 Congress has the power to create such efficiency-based rules of deference.  The Supreme Court 
has been clear about Congress’s broad general powers to regulate procedural and evidentiary 
processes in federal courts:  
[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary 
and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the 
practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate 
matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and 
procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either. 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).  Since 1934, Congress has done this by delegating 
the authority to draft rules of procedure and evidence to the Judicial Conference and that to 
approve them to the Supreme Court, subject to negation by statute.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74 
(2006) (detailing the Supreme Court’s power to prescribe general rules of practice and 
procedure).  Thus, existing practice recognizes broad Congressional powers over such matters 
described in the Hanna case.  
  Rule 52(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, “[F]indings of fact, whether 
based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing 
court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”  
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).  There is no reason to believe that the Constitution itself requires the 
substance of Rule 52(a)(6).  It seems more sensible to see Congress as having a choice within a 
reasonable range of positions concerning the amount of deference required. 
 But while the range of procedural choices left for Congress is broad, it is limited by the 
requirements of individual constitutional rights as the Court interprets them under its power to 
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§ 2254(d)(2) of the federal habeas corpus statute violates these 
requirements should depend on just how much deference that provision 
requires and on whether the court sees it as too restrictive. 
C. Less Comfortably Broadening Klein: Redish and Pudelski 
In a recent article, Martin H. Redish and Christopher R. Pudelski 
agree that Klein prohibits puppeteering laws.237  But they also attribute 
a second set of holdings to Klein.  While subtler, these holdings are seen 
as having a real significance that previously had been missed or only 
vaguely appreciated.  Stripped down, the additional set of holdings 
attributed to Klein find unconstitutional certain types of especially 
misleading laws.238  These laws create a false appearance of providing 
rights or other protections that, in fact, are either non-existent or much 
less substantial than they seem.239  In Klein, the argument goes, the law 
appeared to protect the statutory and constitutional rights to 
compensation of those who were innocent of aiding the Confederacy 
 
engage in definitive constitutional interpretation.  For example, the Court has indicated that its 
duty to enforce the First Amendment requires it to conduct review broader than specified in a 
federal rule or statute.  See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 508 n.27 
(1984) (recognizing the Court’s duty to make an independent review of facts in First Amendment 
cases); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (“This Court’s duty is not limited to 
the elaboration of constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to 
make certain that those principles have been constitutionally applied. This is such a case, 
particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass across ‘the line between speech 
unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated.’”).  Implicitly, these 
cases conclude that, at least one constitutional right carries with it minimal procedural guarantees 
to assure the right is not indirectly gutted.  The Court has not been clear about the details of its 
duty of independent review of facts supporting First Amendment claims or defenses.  And it is 
not clear that the freedom to review facts underlying assertions of First Amendment rights would 
provide the standard for other rights, such as a takings claim. 
 Perhaps the best way of looking at this is that it is a question for the Courts to what extent the 
individual constitutional rights provisions are flexible enough to allow the rights that they create 
to be somewhat negatively affected by systems of procedure, and to what extent the collision of 
rights with procedural limitations unacceptably harms the right.  See, e.g., Bryan Adamson, 
Critical Errors: Courts’ Refusal to Recognize Intentional Race Discrimination Findings as 
Constitutional Facts, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3, 11 (2009) (arguing that, as constitutional 
facts, findings of intentional discrimination should be subjected to less-deferential review). 
237. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 219, at 443–44 (discussing what they see as Klein’s first 
holding that “Congress may not dictate to the courts how to read the Constitution”). 
238. Id. at 449–64. 
239. Redish and Pudelski note that: 
It is our position, however, that, when viewed through the lens of Klein, the legislative 
deception model finds grounding in the Constitution.  To be successful, legislative 
deception must conscript the federal judiciary in the imposition of what amounts to a 
political fraud on the public.  Such a practice violates fundamental notions of judicial 
integrity embodied in Article III, which expressly insulates the federal judiciary from 
improper influence by the political branches by guaranteeing judicial tenure and salary. 
Id. at 461. 
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and whose property had been seized by Union troops.240  However, this 
was a false appearance because “fine print” in the challenged statute 
caused it actually to work in a manner very different from the way one 
would expect on the surface.241  In those authors’ opinion, judicial 
enforcement of such laws involves undermining democratic 
accountability in ways that are so serious that they should be viewed as 
unconstitutional.242 
In Redish and Pudelski’s view, the statute reviewed in Klein violated 
this principle because it made the acceptance of a pardon strong—
though not quite irrebuttable—proof of guilt, leading to ineligibility for 
compensation.243  In their view, this sort of problem was at least a 
vague concern of the Klein majority, even if not conceived of by the 
Court with great clarity in precisely the way the authors offer the 
principle now.244  The authors call this “macro” deception, analogizing 
it to a nearly invisible but dangerous piece of DNA that puts an 
apparently healthy body greatly at risk.245  It is a rule of law potentially 
applying to a number of cases.246 
They distinguish this from an also unconstitutional “micro” deception 
that involves a legislative attempt to control the outcome in a particular 
case.247  They make a convincing constitutional case against micro 
deceptions but do not suggest that Klein raised that issue.248  The statute 
challenged in Klein, in their conceptual scheme and terminology, was 
struck down for being a macro deception among its other fatal flaws.249 
 
240. See id. at 448–51 (providing background and then characterizing the statute in Klein as 
an elaborate shell game deceiving the public). 
241. Id. at 448–52.  
242. Id. at 449–64. 
243. Id. at 449–50. 
244. Id. at 450–51. 
245. Id. at 439 n.8. 
246. Id. at 453–55. 
247. Id. at 455–58.   
248. Their description of the rule against macro deceptions is one of a constitutional right 
independent of whether other constitutional rights are affected.  And none of the examples of 
macro deception that they use turns on whether an independent constitutional right has been 
distorted, but rather simply on whether the public has been misled as to which of Congress’s 
many permissible alternatives it has in fact chosen.  Id. at 453–55. 
249. Id. at 453–55.  The authors, in attributing this holding against macro deception to Klein, 
stated that 
[f]or present purposes, however, suffice it to say that a procedural or evidentiary 
modification should be deemed to alter the essence of applicable substantive law when, 
as a result of the procedural or evidentiary modification, the law’s impact on citizens’ 
primary behavior is so significant as to alter a reasonable voter’s perception of her 
elected representative on the basis of that representative’s vote on the relevant 
substantive legislation.  
Id. at 450. 
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To understand these authors’ views, it is important to realize that a 
constitutional violation of the macro deception sort is not founded on 
evasion or destruction of a separate constitutional right, such as the 
pardon right that would have been destroyed had the Court in Klein 
complied with Congress’s instructions.250  It also covers such deception 
as to the nature of subconstitutional rights, specifically, rights that 
Congress is free to create or not create by statutes.  If Congress falsely 
appears to create such a right, or it creates one but is deceptive as to its 
scope, then the legislation is on that ground alone potentially vulnerable 
to this newly ascribed holding.  If sufficiently substantial, such 
deception violates a completely separate and freestanding constitutional 
right of individuals that Redish and Pudelski read Klein as identifying 
and protecting.251 
The free-standing quality of their proposed rule is what makes it 
different from the anti-puppeteering holding, which they also 
endorse,252 and which is the central, though not exclusive, holding in 
Klein.253  The fact that Klein may have been denied constitutional rights 
created by a presidential pardon is central to a puppeteering violation, 
because the essence of this type of violation is an attempt to use 
jurisdictional powers to force courts to render a judgment that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution.  Klein’s anti-puppeteering holding is 
that jurisdictional powers do not trump separate constitutional limits.254 
How convincing is Redish and Pudelski’s reading of Klein to find a 
holding against all substantially deceptive legislation?  According to my 
current views on how to read cases, it is not necessary that one can say 
with great certainty that holdings attributed to a case actually occurred 
to the authors of the opinion under interpretation.255  I would require 
that an attributed holding could have resolved the case as it was 
resolved and that the opinion’s authors would likely have found it 
 
250. Id. at 450. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 443–44.  See supra note 237 and accompanying text (discussing Redish & 
Pudelski’s view of what they see as Klein’s first holding). 
253. See Young, Klein Revisited, supra note 1, at 1213–15 (addressing the confusion 
surrounding the interpretation of Klein); Young, Congress’s Power to Restrict, supra note 43, at 
157 (explaining that Armstrong is the only Supreme Court case holding a court-stripping 
provision unconstitutional).  See also discussion supra Part I.A.1 (discussing Congress’s judicial 
regulation in the form of using federal courts as puppets to reach substantively unconstitutional 
results). 
254. See supra Part I.A.1 and Part I.D (arguing that state courts must be available to 
constitutional claims if they are excluded from federal courts and that Congress cannot foreclose 
that option from potential claimants). 
255. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (detailing a separate article that could be 
authored on how to attribute meaning to opinions in older cases). 
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attractive.  Hart’s puppeteering reading passes this test, as does my 
extension of it to a protection of Article III courts’ fact-finding 
processes in constitutional cases.256  The strength of an attributed 
holding initially depends on these factors.  To the extent that their 
application yields indeterminate results, then I would add a fourth—
following Dworkin, in close cases, proper attribution of a holding 
depends on its attractiveness as a rule of law in the current legal 
system.257 
In Klein the Court was clearly concerned with separation of powers, 
specifically in interference with its decision processes in constitutional 
cases.258  Both the puppeteering interpretation and one that prohibits 
certain interference with fact-finding, and even with statutory 
interpretation, seem congenial to the Court’s concerns.  And these 
holdings ultimately fit well with Marbury v. Madison—both law at the 
time of Klein and in modern jurisprudence.  Indeed they seem required 
by it.259  One might argue that the Klein Court was concerned with 
deception.  But from the Klein Court’s position, the deception would 
have concerned separation of powers: whether the Article III courts 
were operating as an independent branch of government exercising their 
own constitutional judgment as to what the law says or whether they 
were open only as performers in Congress’s puppet show.260 
But does Klein suggest at any level of generality that, if the courts are 
open and can use independent constitutional judgment to determine 
rights, they should, in the exercise of these powers, recognize a general 
anti-deception right?  Nothing in the opinion, or its context, suggests 
that the Court was concerned with courts taking on such a difficult task.  
This reading goes beyond what credibly might have concerned the Klein 
Court and creates a rule that is currently unattractive in terms of the 
demands it would make on the courts.261  Redish and Pudelski describe 
 
256. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing how Klein might limit congressional 
regulation of judicial fact-finding). 
257. DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 225–32, 240–45.  
258. See supra Part II.B.2(a) (discussing how, unless interpretive methods change, future 
courts will face issues in understanding the difficult language that future Congresses provide in 
statutes). 
259. That constitutional statutes are binding on the courts is so basic a part of our system that 
ordinarily it goes without saying in judicial opinions.  One may find this implicit in Marbury v. 
Madison’s supposition that courts must apply legislative-style law in hierarchical order.  See 
supra note 85 and accompanying text.  See also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 
(1868) (dismissing an appeal concerning a constitutional claim because a statute so commanded). 
260. See Young, Klein Revisited, supra note 1, at 1197, 1213–15 (discussing Klein’s holdings 
concerning Congress’s control over federal jurisdiction and limitations based on the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity). 
261. In the political question it identifies, the Court considers the unworkability or 
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the Court’s function under their proposed rule as follows: 
In deciding whether a procedural rule or evidentiary presumption has 
transformed substantive law’s essence, a reviewing court should ask 
itself whether the voters’ perceptions of their elected representatives’ 
political commitment, revealed by their votes on the legislation in 
question, might reasonably change had they been aware of the true 
substantive impact of the law when combined with its related 
procedural or evidentiary modification.262 
Such a rule requires a court to make judgments that interfere with 
legislation that, in the language of political question cases, may be 
judicially “unmanageable” or “unworkable” even were they otherwise 
desirable.263  It would be difficult to craft more specific methods of 
assessment and metrics about whether and how much voters’ 
perceptions are likely to change if modifying procedural provisions 
were gone or different.  And, were those problems solved, it certainly 
offers no guidance about how much deception is too much deception.  
On several scores, I would not attribute to Klein a holding requiring or 
authorizing courts to scrutinize legislation in this way.  This 
generalization of Klein would likely have been as surprising and 
 
unmanageability of a proposed constitutional standard for judicial intervention among many other 
factors when refraining from pronouncing and applying law.  See Nixon v. United States, 506 
U.S. 224, 228–30 (1993) (finding the impeachment of a federal judge a political question, and 
reciting this factor as merely one, but relying on others).  I have always found it difficult to 
understand just what unworkability might mean in a constitutional law that contains many 
standards that are difficult to apply.  But the proposal that Congress make difficult “consumer 
protection” judgments about the objective deceptiveness of federal statutory provisions appearing 
to create rights seems to me a candidate for the Court’s either determining on the merits that 
macro deception is not a rule of constitutional law or deciding that it might be but is a political 
question.  
262. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 219, at 461. 
263. The political question doctrine, developed by the Supreme Court with little textual 
support, recognizes exceptions to the Court’s power or willingness to exercise judicial review 
over certain sorts of constitutional questions.  See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 
129–49 (discussing the Court’s power to review federal statutes).  The Court has announced 
several criteria that, in various combinations, warrant its refusal to disturb actions of the political 
branch while offering no determination of their constitutionality: “A controversy is 
nonjusticiable—i.e., involves a political question—where there is ‘a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.’”  Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29 (quoting 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
 My contention is that the review of legislation that Redish and Pudelski urge—judicial review 
of statutes for construction or wording that is deceptive to the public—is simply unmanageable.  
It is difficult to come up with a metric of how much “deception” is too much or even whether 
legislation on complex subjects is likely to be significantly misunderstood in ways that benefit the 
views of Congress while providing it with protection from action by the electorate.  Beyond this, 
in deciding whether to recognize a right against deceptive legislation in the first place, the Court 
would naturally ask questions about the manageability of any right it was considering implying 
with little constitutional textual basis. 
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uncongenial to the Court in 1872 as it would be on a purely fresh 
consideration now.  From a Dworkinian perspective, finding such a 
holding is an unconvincing reading of the past that fits badly into the 
present. 
CONCLUSION 
United States v. Klein is an important and generative precedent 
dealing with the core freedom of courts, when granted jurisdiction by 
statute, to function fully as courts.  It has little to say directly about 
court-stripping—the debatable power of Congress to close the federal 
courts to constitutional claims while leaving the state courts open to 
them.  But its prohibitions seem congruent with the best interpretation 
of congressional powers over courts’ jurisdiction: that they do not 
include the power to exclude sets of congressionally disfavored 
constitutional claims from the jurisdiction of both lower federal courts 
and state courts.  At its center, Klein prohibits Congress from requiring 
courts to issue judgments on the merits that conflict with constitutional 
requirements.  Through the operation of the law of preclusion, such 
judgments, if valid, would have the practical effect of excluding 
constitutional rights from enforcement in any court, thus extinguishing 
them. 
Howard Wasserman and other scholars have offered broad 
reassessments of Klein in recent years.  All of these recognize in various 
formulations that Klein indicates that courts which are open for business 
cannot be closed off from using the Constitution in deciding cases.  
Occasionally, scholars have seen in Klein limits on tampering with 
federal courts’ fact-finding processes.  Klein’s concerns and broad 
language comfortably generalize that far.  It also seems right to 
generalize Klein far enough to identify it with limits on unreasonable 
congressional tampering with the sources of inspiration, analogies, and 
tools that federal courts use in interpreting ambiguous statutes.  To see 
in Klein a general rule against legislation that seriously deceives voters 
as to its effects, expands that decision far beyond the concerns that 
occupied the Klein Court.  The rule proposed by Redish and Pudelski is 
one that would require a court to spend too many resources second 
guessing Congress about the clarity of its legislation over the entire 
range of statutory law, not just statutes addressing how the court 
functions.  At the time of Klein, as well as now, that rule would seem to 
require more of the courts than their resources permit. 
In the end, Wasserman is right that Klein is a limited precedent, 
though not a severely limited one, and that it is a product of 
pathological times.  And its core holding is an almost effortless 
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extension of Marbury—a recognition that Congress’s jurisdictional 
powers cannot cut functioning courts off from the Constitution.  But its 
more general recognition of the limits on interference with courts’ 
decision processes has real possibilities for particularization and 
expansion by courts in the preservation of third branch integrity.  And 
while pathology, by definition, cannot be normal, it is all too often with 
us.  Though Klein seldom has been used by the courts to invalidate 
pathological laws, its deterrent effect on their passage may have at least 
a little to do with that.  Properly broadened, it warns Congress that 
courts must have some real freedom to determine and apply the law and 
to find the facts, without unreasonable interference that would make the 
existence of a functioning and independent judicial branch a mirage. 
 
